American University Washington College of Law

Digital Commons @ American University Washington College
of Law
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals

Scholarship & Research

2007

Fixing Fair Use
Michael W. Carroll
Villanova University School of Law, mcarroll@wcl.american.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/facsch_lawrev
Part of the Information and Library Science Commons, and the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Carroll, Michael W. “Fixing Fair Use.” North Carolina Law Review 85, no. 4 (May 2007): 1087-1154.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Scholarship & Research at Digital Commons @ American University Washington College
of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons
@ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact fbrown@wcl.american.edu.

CARROLL.BKI3

4/17/2007 3:01:43 PM

FIXING FAIR USE*
MICHAEL W. CARROLL**
The fair use doctrine in copyright law balances expressive freedoms
by permitting one to use another’s copyrighted expression under
certain circumstances. The doctrine’s context sensitivity renders it
of little value to those who require reasonable ex ante certainty
about the legality of a proposed use. This Article advances a
legislative proposal to create a Fair Use Board in the U.S.
Copyright Office that would have the power to declare a proposed
use of another’s copyrighted work to be a fair use. Like a private
letter ruling from the IRS or a “no-action” letter from the SEC, a
favorable opinion would immunize only the petitioner from
copyright liability for the proposed use, leaving the copyright owner
free to challenge the same or similar uses by other parties. The
copyright owner would receive notice and have an opportunity to
challenge a petition. Fair use rulings would be subject to
administrative review in the Copyright Office and to judicial review
by the federal courts of appeals. The Article closes with a
discussion of alternative approaches to fixing fair use.
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What is [f]air [u]se? We would all appreciate a clear, crisp
answer. . . . [F]ar from clear and crisp, fair use is better
described as a shadowy territory whose boundaries are
disputed, more so now that it includes cyberspace than ever
before. . . . [M]any legal scholars, politicians, copyright owners
and users and their lawyers agree that fair use is so hard to
understand that it fails to provide effective guidance for the use
of others’ works today. But the fact is, we really must
understand and rely on it.1

1. Office of General Counsel, University of Texas, Fair Use of Copyrighted
Materials, http://www.utsystem.edu/OGC/intellectualProperty/copypol2.htm (last visited
Feb. 25, 2007) (emphasis omitted).
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INTRODUCTION
Copyright law grants broad exclusive rights to encourage authors
to create and to distribute new expressive works. These rights are
powerful. Using copyright, a sculptor can halt distribution of a major
motion picture because a scene includes the image of his sculpture
without authorization,2 the heir of a famous author can threaten to
halt publication of unfavorable scholarship,3 and a songwriter can
restrain distribution of a song that borrows three words and a portion
of the melody from his song.4 While this power may render the
author’s expression marketable,5 it is also subject to abuse.6
When fashioning modern copyright law, Congress recognized
that circumstances would arise in which the broad sweep of copyright
would be socially undesirable, and it responded by codifying a series
of limitations on copyright’s scope.7 Fair use is the first and most
general of these limitations.8 It renders unauthorized use of a

2. Sculptor Frederick E. Hart brought suit to enjoin distribution of the film, Devil’s
Advocate, which included a scene in which Hart’s bas-relief sculpture, Ex Nihilo, at the
entrance to the Washington National Cathedral, comes to life. See Brooke A. Masters,
Va. Judge Tells Filmmaker To Settle Suit or Halt Video, WASH. POST, Feb. 11, 1998, at B2.
Warner Brothers studio asserted that, if issued, the injunction would cost the studio $14
million to $23.4 million. See Jonathan Groner, Hart et al. v. Warner Bros. et al., LEGAL
TIMES, Mar. 2, 1998, at 17; see also K.J. Greene, Motion Picture Copyright Infringement
and the Presumption of Irreparable Harm: Toward a Reevaluation of the Standard for
Preliminary Injunctive Relief, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 173, 188–90 (2000) (describing this and
similar cases).
3. See, e.g., D.T. Max, The Injustice Collector, NEW YORKER, June 19, 2006, at 34–43
(describing the use of copyright law by James Joyce’s grandson to threaten scholars).
4. See Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 182,
183 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (enjoining distribution of a song by rapper Biz Markie that sampled
Gilbert O’Sullivan’s Alone Again (Naturally)).
5. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985)
(“By establishing a marketable right to the use of one’s expression, copyright supplies the
economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas.”).
6. See, e.g., West Publ’g Co. v. Mead Data Cent., Inc., 799 F.2d 1219, 1229 (8th Cir.
1986) (affirming a preliminary injunction against Lexis for distributing public domain
judicial opinions marked up with West’s allegedly copyrighted page numbers). But see
Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publ’g Co., 158 F.3d 693, 699 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that
West’s star pagination feature was not protected by copyright). West’s assertion that page
numbers constituted copyrightable expression because the numbers reflected West’s effort
in arranging cases in its reports was quite dubious at the time it was asserted, and the claim
became untenable after the Supreme Court made clear that copyrightable expression
requires originality rather than mere effort. See generally Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel.
Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991) (holding that the Constitution requires “independent
creation plus a modicum of creativity”).
7. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000) (defining limitations on copyrightable subject
matter); id. §§ 107–22 (imposing limitations on the scope of exclusive rights).
8. See id. § 107.
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copyrighted work noninfringing if the balance of a set of contextspecific factors favors such use.9
While the doctrine’s attention to context has many salutary
attributes, it is so case-specific that it offers precious little guidance
about its scope to artists, educators, journalists, Internet users, and
others who require use of another’s copyrighted expression in order
to communicate effectively.10 The conventional wisdom is that this ex
ante uncertainty is simply the price that policymakers must accept for
choosing a standard over a rule.11 By this logic, if legal uncertainty
about copyright law’s scope has become more troubling in the digital
era—and it has—Congress should clarify fair use by rendering it more
rule-like, as has been done through the fair dealing privilege found in
English, Canadian, and Australian law.12
This Article intervenes in the general rules/standards discourse
by showing that the law can have its context-sensitive standards and
use them, too, by coupling standards with an advisory opinion
mechanism that provides ex ante certainty in specific cases. Such a
mechanism already has been deployed in a variety of branches of
federal law, such as federal regulation of income taxation,13 sale of
securities,14 and subsidized health care.15 In operation, the advisory
opinion provides guidance in particular situations without creating a
thick body of binding precedent that ossifies the regulatory system.
This Article applies this insight by advancing a legislative
proposal to create a Fair Use Board in the Copyright Office that
would have authority to adjudicate fair use petitions and, subject to
judicial review, issue fair use rulings. The effect of such a ruling, if
favorable, would be roughly analogous to a private letter ruling from
the Internal Revenue Service16 or a “no-action” letter from the
Securities and Exchange Commission17—the individual user would be
9. Id.
10. See infra notes 32–37 and accompanying text (documenting agreement concerning
fair use uncertainty).
11. See infra note 63 (citing to the rules/standards literature).
12. See infra Part III.B (discussing possibility of fair use rules, including fair dealing).
13. See 26 U.S.C. § 7805; Rev. Proc. 2004-1, 2004-1 C.B. 1, § 2.01.
14. See 17 C.F.R. § 202.1(d) (2006) (authorizing “No-Action Letter”).
15. See 42 C.F.R. §§ 411.370–.389 (authorizing advisory opinions regarding Medicare
statute).
16. See 26 U.S.C. § 7805; Rev. Proc. 2004-1, 2004-1 C.B. 1, § 2.01 (“A ‘letter ruling’ is
a written determination issued to a taxpayer by the Associate office that interprets and
applies the tax laws to the taxpayer’s specific set of facts.”).
17. See 17 C.F.R. § 202.1–.2. No-action letters represent the position of the SEC’s
enforcement staff with respect to a proposed transaction, and the Commission is not
bound by that position. See id. However, these appear to be treated as binding de facto.
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immune from copyright liability for the proposed use, but the ruling
would be nonprecedential. Under the proposal, the fair use
petitioner would be obliged to serve notice on the copyright owner,
who would have an opportunity to contest the petition. Either party
could appeal an unfavorable ruling administratively and then to any
federal circuit court of appeals with personal jurisdiction over the
parties.
The proposal is fair use-neutral because it would not change the
substantive entitlements granted by the Copyright Act. Rather, it
would simply give fair use a fair chance. Copyright owners would
have a full opportunity to assert their rights and would be no more
prejudiced by choosing not to contest particular petitions than they
currently are when they choose not to pursue action against uses they
deem infringing.
The problems caused by fair use uncertainty are sufficiently
urgent that I also endorse two less attractive proposals in the event
that the primary proposal is ahead of its time. These alternatives
focus on a different approach to fixing fair use—reducing the risks of
relying on fair use by limiting the remedies available against a user
who misinterprets the doctrine’s scope in good faith. Under the first
alternative, Congress would still create a Fair Use Board, but the
Board would serve only in an advisory capacity. A favorable fair use
opinion would limit a user’s liability in the event that a court
subsequently determined that the subject use was infringing.18 Under
the second alternative, Congress would extend to all potential fair
users a limit on statutory damages currently available only to
libraries, archives, colleges, universities, and public broadcasters.19
Finally, this Article analyzes why attempts to fix fair use by
rendering it more rule-like would be normatively unattractive and
See Donna M. Nagy, Judicial Reliance on Regulatory Interpretations in SEC No-Action
Letters: Current Problems and a Proposed Framework, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 921, 943
(1998) (“[R]ecipients highly value no-action letters, undoubtedly because the Commission
appears to have never proceeded against the recipient of a no-action letter who acted in
good faith on the letter’s advice.”).
18. This proposal could be implemented in conjunction with the current legislative
process concerning orphan works. See The Orphan Works Act of 2006, H.R. 5439, 109th
Cong. (2d Sess. 2006), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c109:H.R.5439.
See generally U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS (2006), available at
http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/orphan-report-full.pdf (suggesting proposals for limiting
liability of a user who made a good faith effort to find an untraceable copyright owner).
19. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2). This limitation applies when one of these privileged
users infringes copyright with a mistaken but good faith belief that the use was a fair use.
In addition, this alternative proposal would limit the availability of injunctive relief in the
case of users acting in good faith.
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would be ineffective in any case. Congress correctly rejected rule-like
proposals when it codified fair use in the Copyright Act of 197620
because rules would be significantly over- and under-inclusive. The
expressive interests of authors and potential fair users are of
constitutional import and should be balanced with a degree of context
sensitivity that rules cannot supply.
I. FAIR USE UNCERTAINTY
The fair use doctrine is rooted in the truth that we sometimes
must use the expression of another to express ourselves effectively.21
Fair use protects a zone of expressive opportunity for criticism,
comment, parody, education, and other socially beneficial forms of
communication that might not occur if copyright owners were given
complete control over how their works were used.22 Fair use
functions effectively only when users are reasonably confident in the
legality of their use or when they are willing to adopt and defend a
fair use position in the face of an uncertain legal standard.
This Part demonstrates that ascertaining the scope of fair use ex
ante is sufficiently uncertain that the doctrine is not effectively
fulfilling its important function. After highlighting the constitutional
dimension of fair use analysis, this Part explores the doctrinal sources
of uncertainty. It then shows that litigation over certain types of use
in which the issue of fair use recurs generally has not served to clarify
the scope of fair use. Finally, this Part explains why potential fair
users who seek ex ante certainty through a declaratory judgment
proceeding rarely can do so.

20. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17
U.S.C.).
21. See, e.g., Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4436)
(principal judicial architect of fair use doctrine recognizing that “[e]very book in literature,
science and art, borrows, and must necessarily borrow, and use much which was well
known and used before”). Some may be inclined to contest the truth of this claim. But, in
its most limited form, the claim holds that we must be able to quote one another to
communicate effectively, and I am aware of no legislator, judicial officer, or copyright
scholar who contests the value of copyright law’s privilege for unauthorized quotation.
See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 10(1), Sept. 9,
1886, as last revised July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (“It shall be
permissible to make quotations from a work which has already been lawfully made
available to the public, provided that their making is compatible with fair practice, and
their extent does not exceed that justified by the purpose, including quotations from
newspaper articles and periodicals in the form of press summaries.”).
22. See, e.g., Paul Goldstein, Fair Use in a Changing World, 50 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y
U.S.A. 133, 141 (2003) (“Some copyright bargains will fail because the copyright owner
refuses to license a proposed use on any terms at all.”).
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A. Overview
Concerns about the problem of fair use uncertainty have
intensified recently because fair use has been called upon in a variety
of new situations. Wide distribution of digital technologies has
greatly increased copyright law’s domain while also giving rise to a
significantly larger pool of potential fair users attracted to the
remarkable reproductive and adaptive power of these new
technologies. The dispute over Google’s digitization of large library
collections is one of many signs demonstrating that, in the digital age,
questions of fair use have taken on greater urgency.23
The Supreme Court has further fueled this urgency by
recognizing, without describing, the constitutional substrate
undergirding the fair use doctrine. In Eldred v. Ashcroft,24 the Court
took up a claim that the First Amendment also directly secures a
speaker’s right to use the copyrighted expression of another under
certain circumstances. Writing for the Court, Justice Ginsburg
responded:
The First Amendment securely protects the freedom to make—
or decline to make—one’s own speech; it bears less heavily
when speakers assert the right to make other people’s speeches.
To the extent such assertions raise First Amendment concerns,
copyright’s built-in free speech safeguards are generally
adequate to address them. We recognize that the D.C. Circuit
spoke too broadly when it declared copyrights “categorically
immune from challenges under the First Amendment.” But
when, as in this case, Congress has not altered the traditional
contours of copyright protection, further First Amendment
scrutiny is unnecessary.25
This holding follows from Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enterprises,26 in which the Court held that because the fair use
doctrine serves as one of copyright law’s two free speech safeguards,

23. See, e.g., Complaint at 2, Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., No. 05-CV-8136
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2005), available at http://www.unc.edu/courses/2006spring/law/357c/
001/projects/jsieman/authorsguild.pdf (alleging that large-scale intermediate digitization of
libraries’ book collections infringes copyright); Jonathan Band, The Google Print Library
Project: A Copyright Analysis, http://www.policybandwidth.com/doc/googleprint.pdf (last
visited Apr. 15, 2007) (analyzing Google’s fair use argument in response to The Authors
Guild suit).
24. 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
25. Id. at 221.
26. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
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there was no need to expand its scope in order to save it from running
afoul of the First Amendment.27
To be clear, neither Eldred nor Harper & Row holds that the fair
use doctrine as currently interpreted is constitutionally required. But,
by rejecting the D.C. Circuit’s categorical immunity for copyright in
Eldred, the Court held, a fortiori, that at least some uses of another’s
copyrighted expression qualify as speech protected by the First
Amendment. Thus, the holding in Eldred is that the fair use doctrine
as currently interpreted usually provides a defense to infringement at
least as robust as the one the First Amendment would require and
therefore this First Amendment defense requires no further
specification at this time. From the free speech perspective, then, fair
use is no constitutional understudy—it is the starring attraction.
Regrettably, the “built-in free speech safeguards”28 of copyright
law lack important procedural protections for potential fair users that
the First Amendment provides for those who utter other forms of
protected speech. In particular, the Court, having recognized that the
risk of legal uncertainty is of particular concern when the law
regulates speech, has determined that the First Amendment requires
the safeguards of the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines to contain
such uncertainty.29 By contrast, the substantive context sensitivity of
the fair use doctrine often fails to rein in the vague and sometimes
overly broad scope of copyright law.30
A fair user’s uncertainty about the scope of her rights stems not
only from the fair use doctrine’s case specificity but also from its
codification in a nonexclusive four-factor test set forth in § 107 of the
Copyright Act.31
Those familiar with copyright law are well
acquainted with the difficulties courts face in providing guidance
under § 107. Judge Posner, for example, has candidly admitted that
only minimal guidance can be drawn from the four factors,32 and
Judge Leval has succinctly described the problem:
27. See id. at 560 (“In view of the First Amendment protections already embodied in
the Copyright Act’s distinction between copyrightable expression and uncopyrightable
facts and ideas, and the latitude for scholarship and comment traditionally afforded by fair
use, we see no warrant for expanding the doctrine of fair use to create what amounts to a
public figure exception to copyright.”).
28. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221.
29. See infra note 227 (describing First Amendment overbreadth and vagueness).
30. See James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property
Law, 116 YALE L.J. 882, 884–86 (2007) (describing a feedback loop in which fair use
uncertainty leads to licensing that serves to reduce the scope of fair use in future cases).
31. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
32. See Ty, Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l Ltd., 292 F.3d 512, 522 (7th Cir. 2002) (“The important
point is simply that, as the Supreme Court made clear . . . the four factors are a checklist of
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Judges do not share a consensus on the meaning of fair use.
Earlier decisions provide little basis for predicting later ones.
Reversals and divided courts are commonplace. . . . Confusion
has not been confined to judges. Writers, historians, publishers,
and their legal advisers can only guess and pray as to how
courts will resolve copyright disputes.33
The treatise writers are in accord that the fair use doctrine
produces significant ex ante uncertainty.34 Indeed, when writing more
pointedly in a legal periodical, treatise author David Nimmer
examined many fair use cases and the findings on each of the factors
and concluded that “had Congress legislated a dartboard rather than
the particular four fair use factors . . . it appears that the upshot would
be the same.”35 That is to say, “the four factors fail to drive the
analysis, but rather serve as convenient pegs on which to hang
antecedent conclusions.”36 Other legal scholars also have expressed
concern about fair use uncertainty, and have suggested a variety of
other approaches to reduce it.37
things to be considered rather than a formula for decision; and likewise the list of statutory
purposes.”); see also William F. Patry & Richard A. Posner, Fair Use and Statutory Reform
in the Wake of Eldred, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1639, 1645 (2004) (“All section 107 really amounts
to in practical terms is confirmation that the courts are entitled to allow in the name of fair
use a certain undefined amount of unauthorized copying from copyrighted works. This
may seem an unsatisfactory solution to the problem of defining fair use, and indeed the
uncertain contours of the defense raise serious problems . . . .”).
33. Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1106–07
(1990).
34. See 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 13.05[A][1][b] (citing Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132,
142 (2d Cir. 1998)); 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 12.2.2, at 12:34
(3d ed. 2005); WILLIAM F. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW 45 (2d
ed. 1995); see also The Patry Copyright Blog, http://williampatry.blogspot.com/2005_05_
01_williampatry_archive.html (May 3, 2005, 08:30 EST).
35. David Nimmer, “Fairest of Them All” and Other Fairy Tales of Fair Use, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2003, at 263, 280.
36. Id. at 281. Professor Barton Beebe’s statistical analysis of more than 200 fair use
opinions is consistent with this conclusion. See Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the
U.S. Copyright Fair Use Cases, 1978–2005: A Quick Report of Initial Findings for IPSC
2006, at 7–8 n.24 (Aug. 10, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on filed with the North
Carolina Law Review) (“While I know of no statistical way to show that courts are indeed
putting the cart before the horse when they engage in a Section 107 analysis, the strong
evidence of stampeding is at least consistent with Nimmer’s description.”).
37. For example, Professor Jessica Litman would rein in the initial grant of rights to
render users’ rights more ascertainable. See JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 166–
86 (2001) (proposing an unfair competition standard for infringement). Professor Michael
Madison argues for a pattern-oriented approach to fair use and would amend § 107 to give
courts greater freedom to identify the social practices that should inform fair use analysis.
See Michael J. Madison, Rewriting Fair Use and the Future of Copyright Reform, 23
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 391 (2005) [hereinafter Madison, Rewriting Fair Use];
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As one might expect, potential fair users who seek to make
public use of another’s work often are deterred from engaging in a
desired use by the uncertain scope of the fair use doctrine coupled
with the high costs of litigation and the potentially enormous
statutory damages that a court could award if it disagreed with the
user’s fair use judgment.38 Even when a creator is satisfied that a
contemplated use is legally fair, many media gatekeepers, such as
television broadcasters, film distributors, and book publishers, will
not accept such fair use determinations, nor will they rely on their
own fair use analysis.39 Instead, in many cases these gatekeepers
require copyright clearance any time an artist seeks to express herself
with the speech of another through fair use quotation, incidental use,
or even de minimis use.
These institutional practices and
expectations are congealing into a “clearance culture” that
circumscribes or nullifies the rights that copyright law expressly
grants users to use another’s work without clearance.
B.

Doctrinal Causes of Uncertainty

If uncertainty about copyright’s scope chills expression, surely
there must be doctrinal responses that would provide greater clarity.
There has been no shortage of scholarly commentary directed at

Michael J. Madison, A Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1525 (2004) [hereinafter Madison, A Pattern-Oriented Approach]. Separately, rather than
seeking a legislative response to fair use uncertainty, Professor Peter Jaszi, along with the
Center for Social Media, has been working with documentary filmmakers to generate
negotiated fair use norms that would be instantiated in a set of “best practices” adopted by
content industries, particularly the film industry. See CTR. FOR SOC. MEDIA, AM. UNIV.
SCH. OF COMMC’N, DOCUMENTARY FILMMAKERS’ STATEMENT OF BEST PRACTICES IN
FAIR USE (2005), available at http://www.centerforsocialmedia.org/files/pdf/fair_use_
final.pdf. The proposals advanced in this Article could work in conjunction with any of
these approaches.
38. See MARJORIE HEINS & TRICIA BECKLES, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, N.Y.
UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, WILL FAIR USE SURVIVE: FREE EXPRESSION IN THE AGE OF
COPYRIGHT CONTROL 5–6 (2005), available at http://www.fepproject.org/policyreports/
WillFairUseSurvive.pdf (summarizing gatekeeping institutions that require copyright
clearance for even very small uses of copyrighted works, such as the quotation of one or
two sentences); R. Polk Wagner, The Perfect Storm: Intellectual Property and Public
Values, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 423, 429 (2005) (discussing growing uncertainty concerning
the scope of fair use and the “truly pernicious effects” of such uncertainty); Gibson, supra
note 30, at 884; see also Rebecca Tushnet, Copyright as a Model for Free Speech Law:
What Copyright Has in Common with Anti-Pornography Laws, Campaign Finance
Reform, and Telecommunications Regulation, 42 B.C. L. REV. 1, 20–21, 24 (2000)
(describing the chilling effects of copyright law’s vague scope).
39. See infra notes 166–69 and accompanying text.
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providing a fair use theory that would lead to such clarity.40 To date,
however, Congress and the courts have resisted attempts to clarify
fair use. The remainder of this Part explains why. Readers already
familiar with the doctrinal causes of fair use uncertainty may wish to
proceed directly to the proposal in Part II.
1. Copyright Infringement
Copyright applies to any “original work of authorship” at the
moment it is “fixed in a tangible medium of expression.”41 Originality
is a very low standard that requires only a minimal spark of
creativity.42 As a consequence, copyright applies to a broad range of
works, including shampoo bottle labels,43 technical manuals,44 county
tax maps,45 commercial photographs of products,46 and some blank
forms.47

40. A sample of this extensive literature includes Laura R. Bradford, Parody and
Perception: Using Cognitive Research To Expand Fair Use in Copyright, 46 B.C. L. REV.
705 (2005); William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 1659 (1988); Jane C. Ginsburg, Putting Cars on the “Information Superhighway”:
Authors, Exploiters, and Copyright in Cyberspace, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1466 (1995);
Goldstein, supra note 22; Wendy Gordon, Excuse and Justification in the Law of Fair Use:
Transaction Costs Have Always Been Only Part of the Story, 50 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y
U.S.A. 149 (2003); Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and
Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600
(1982); Justin Hughes, Fair Use Across Time, 50 UCLA L. REV. 775 (2003); Raymond
Shih Ray Ku, Consumers and Creative Destruction: Fair Use Beyond Market Failure, 18
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 539 (2003); Leval, supra note 33; Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Fair Use
and Market Failure: Sony Revisited, 82 B.U. L. REV. 975 (2002); Madison, Rewriting Fair
Use, supra note 37; Nimmer, supra note 35; Ruth Okediji, Givers, Takers, and Other Kinds
of Users: A Fair Use Doctrine for Cyberspace, 53 FLA. L. REV. 107 (2001); Patry & Posner,
supra note 32; L. Ray Patterson, Understanding Fair Use, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Spring 1992, at 249; Symposium, Copyright and Personal Copying: Sony v. Universal
Studios Twenty-One Years Later, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 749 (2005); Rebecca Tushnet,
Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How Copying Serves It,
114 YALE L.J. 535 (2004); Lloyd L. Weinreb, Fair Use, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1291 (1999);
Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, The More Things Change the Less They Seem
“Transformed”: Some Reflections on Fair Use, 46 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 251 (1998).
41. 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(a), 201(a) (2000).
42. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345–46 (1991).
43. See, e.g., Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L’anza Research Int’l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135,
135 (1998).
44. See, e.g., Highland Tank & Mfg. Co. v. PS Int’l, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 2d 348, 360–61
(W.D. Pa. 2005).
45. See, e.g., County of Suffolk v. First Am. Real Estate Solutions, 261 F.3d 179, 195
(2d Cir. 2001).
46. See Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 225 F.3d 1068, 1073 (9th Cir. 2000).
47. See Bucklew v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co., LLP, 329 F.3d 923, 929 (7th Cir.
2003).
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The Copyright Act grants authors the exclusive rights to
reproduce, to publicly distribute, to publicly perform, to publicly
display, and to adapt their copyrighted works.48 The copyright
owner’s right to control reproduction of the work extends to partial
borrowings and to adaptations so long as a user had access to the
owner’s work and the user’s work “has ‘substantial similarity’ ” to the
copyright owner’s in the eyes of an ordinary observer.49 The
copyright owner’s rights are limited to her original expression and do
not encompass any idea, procedure, process, system, method of
operation, concept, principle, or discovery.50
Liability for copyright infringement is strict. Under the current
interpretation of the Copyright Act, members of the public who
exercise any of the copyright owner’s rights without authorization are
prima facie infringers regardless of their intent or knowledge.51 In
this environment, producers, distributors, readers, viewers, and all
other users have a strong interest in distinguishing between infringing
events and noninfringing events.52
This is particularly true because the consequences of
infringement can be quite severe. Courts may enjoin the continued
distribution of an infringing work and can order the destruction of all
infringing copies.53 In addition, the copyright owner may elect at any
time before final judgment is rendered to receive actual damages,
including the infringer’s profits attributable to infringement, or
statutory damages.54 The range for statutory damages is between
$750 and $30,000 per infringed work, and this amount can be
increased to $150,000 per work if willful infringement is proven.55 In
48. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000) (granting rights to reproduce the work in copies,
prepare derivative works, distribute the work in copies, publicly perform the work, or
publicly display the work).
49. See Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Bus. Data, Inc., 166 F.3d 65, 70 (2d
Cir. 1999).
50. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). Line-drawing difficulties under the idea/expression dichotomy
frequently arise in cases such as narrative works in which plot lines and characters
resemble one another. Does, for example, West Side Story borrow Shakespeare’s
expression in Romeo and Juliet or merely his idea? This particular difficulty is not the
focus of our present concern, but fair use determinations are analogously difficult.
Logically, fair use does not arise as an issue until after the plaintiff establishes that the
defendant used the plaintiff’s expression.
51. See Marder v. Lopez, 450 F.3d 445, 453 (9th Cir. 2006).
52. See Office of General Counsel, supra note 1 (expressing desire for better guidance
from the law as to the distinction between infringing conduct and noninfringing fair use).
53. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 502, 503(b).
54. See id. § 504.
55. Id. It is for this reason that the Recording Industry Association of America has
threatened individuals hosting music files on peer-to-peer networks with the prospect of

CARROLL.BKI3

2007]

4/17/2007 3:01:43 PM

FIXING FAIR USE

1099

many cases, the real threat is the fee-shifting provision by which
defendants can be made to pay the copyright owner’s attorney’s fees,
which can exceed the amount of damages.56
2. Fair Use
In the language of the Copyright Act, fair use is a “limitation” on
the exclusive rights granted to the copyright owner.57 One could
reasonably read the statutory language to require the copyright
owner to prove that the defendant’s use exceeded the bounds of fair
use in order to show infringement.58 Under current law, however, the
copyright owner need prove only ownership of a valid copyright and
that the defendant exercised one of the exclusive rights with respect
to the registered work.59 The defendant must prove fair use as an
affirmative defense.60
The scope of the fair use defense is sufficiently uncertain in light
of the potential penalties to scare away a sizeable portion of potential
users whose proposed use of a copyrighted work would be fair if the
matter were litigated to judgment.61 To see why, begin with § 107:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the
fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by
reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means
specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies
hundreds of millions of dollars in potential damages: $150,000 x number of songs hosted =
potential statutory damages. See Reuters, RIAA Threatens Orgy of Lawsuits, WIRED,
June 25, 2003, available at http://www.wired.com/news/digiwood/0,1412,59391,00.html.
56. See 17 U.S.C. § 505; see also Wall Data Inc. v. L.A. County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 447
F.3d 769, 776, 787 (9th Cir. 2006) (rejecting a fair use defense and awarding the copyright
owner $210,000 in damages and $516,271 for attorneys’ fees); Schiffer Publ’g, Ltd. v.
Chronicle Books, LLC, No. Civ.A.0003-44444962, 2005 WL 1244923, at *1 (E.D. Pa. May
24, 2005) (same with $150,000 in statutory damages and $205,586.67 for attorneys’ fees);
Marshall & Swift v. BS & A Software, 871 F. Supp. 952, 954 (W.D. Mich. 1994) (same with
$9,450 in damages and $38,713 for attorneys’ fees); Peter Jaszi, 505 and All That—The
Defendant’s Dilemma, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1992, at 107, 107 (“It seems
likely that, over the years, no provision of the American copyright law has exceeded that
now codified as 17 U.S.C. section 505 in influencing the actual conduct of infringement
litigation.”).
57. See 17 U.S.C. § 107.
58. Cf. Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L’Anza Research Int’l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 144–45
(1998) (emphasizing that § 106 rights are limited by §§ 107 through 120).
59. See Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 137 (2d
Cir. 1998).
60. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994); Harper & Row,
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 561 (1985); Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena
Vista Home Entm’t, Inc., 342 F.3d 191, 197 (3d Cir. 2003).
61. See supra note 34.
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for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an
infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use
made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to
be considered shall include—
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit
educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or
value of the copyrighted work.
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding
of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the
above factors.62
Within the literature on rules and standards,63 fair use is a
quintessential standard.64 It is well established that standards trade
off greater ex ante certainty for greater ex post context sensitivity
unless cultural or other contextual factors function to cabin a
decisionmaker’s discretion.65 One strategy for improving the ex ante
certainty of a legal standard’s application is to subject its application
to evidentiary presumptions, which limit the range of relevant
evidence. However, Congress and the courts have resisted attempts

62. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
63. The rules/standards literature is substantial. See, e.g., MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE
TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 15–63 (1987); FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE
RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISIONMAKING IN LAW
AND IN LIFE 104 (1991); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis,
42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law
Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1687–1713 (1976); Eric A. Posner, Standards, Rules,
and Social Norms, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 101 (1997); Margaret Jane Radin,
Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REV. 781, 783–91 (1989); Carol M. Rose,
Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 592–93 (1988); Pierre Schlag,
Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 379–430 (1985); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems
with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953 (1995).
64. The terms “rules” and “standards” are at this point used as shorthand to
differentiate degrees of ex post discretion enjoyed by those who apply the law, and it is in
that sense that fair use is a standard. But commentators have laid out more complex
taxonomies according to which standards are differentiated from other provisions, such as
multifactor tests, which also provide significant ex post discretion. See, e.g., Sunstein,
supra note 63, at 963–65. For those for whom this is a distinction with a difference, I mean
to say that fair use is a multifactor test rather than a standard.
65. See id. (acknowledging that ex post discretion conferred by standards and factors
is subject to cabining by interpretive practices); Kaplow, supra note 63, at 559–60.
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to deploy this strategy in order to clarify the scope of fair use.66 Here
is a quick summary of why this resistance has resulted in significant ex
ante uncertainty.67
Preamble. Section 107 identifies types of unauthorized uses of a
copyrighted work that might be deemed fair—criticism, comment,
news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research. This list could
serve to clarify the scope of a fair user’s rights in two ways: the list
could be construed as exclusive and/or the listed uses could be
deemed presumptively fair. Courts have resisted both approaches.
The listed uses are illustrative only,68 and they are not entitled to a
presumption of fairness.69 Consequently, the language of the
preamble does little work in the judicial application of fair use. The
application of the factors leads to similar results.
Purpose and Character of the Use. Under the first factor, courts
focus on whether the use should be characterized as commercial and
whether it should be deemed transformative.70 The defendant’s good
faith has been added, or perhaps recognized, as a material subfactor.71 A commercial use may threaten the copyright owner’s core
economic incentive and therefore is less likely to be fair. The
Supreme Court initially favored a presumption against commercial
use, defined broadly,72 but it soon recognized an overbreadth problem
66. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577–78 (1994) (“The
task is not to be simplified with bright-line rules, for the statute, like the doctrine it
recognizes, calls for case-by-case analysis. . . . Nor may the four statutory factors be
treated in isolation, one from another. All are to be explored, and the results weighed
together, in light of the purposes of copyright.”).
67. For a more detailed analysis of the language, see Madison, A Pattern-Oriented
Approach, supra note 37, at 1550–66.
68. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578–79 (describing the preamble as containing examples
that may guide analysis); Ringgold v. Black Entm’t Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 78 (2d
Cir. 1997) (stating that the examples in the preamble should not be completely ignored);
Pac. & S. Co., Inc. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490, 1494–95 (11th Cir. 1984) (stating that the
preamble is illustrative and holding that the trial court erred in treating the uses listed in
the preamble as establishing a threshold to be cleared before applying the four factors).
69. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584 (stating that an educational purpose is not
guaranteed to be a fair use); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S.
539, 561 (1985) (stating that the statute was not intended to create any presumption of
fairness).
70. See, e.g., Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 608–09
(2d Cir. 2006); Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 800–01 (9th Cir.
2003).
71. See, e.g., NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Inst., 364 F.3d 471, 479 (2d Cir. 2004); Nunez v.
Caribbean Int’l News Corp., 235 F.3d 18, 23 (1st Cir. 2000); Beebe, supra note 36, at 12
(finding that 13% of opinions reviewed explicitly considered whether defendant’s use was
in good or bad faith).
72. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984)
(“Thus, although every commercial use of copyrighted material is presumptively an unfair
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with such an approach.73 Under current law, all of the factors must be
examined in evaluating a claim of fair use.74
In contrast to the concerns for copyright owners engendered by
commercial use, focus on transformative use emphasizes the public’s
perspective by asking whether the user’s work supplants the original,
“or instead adds something new, with a further purpose or different
character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or
message.”75 The doctrine of transformative use76 is a frequently
litigated, though indeterminate subfactor.77
Evidence of a defendant’s commercial exploitation, good faith,
or expressive transformation of the plaintiff’s work will always be
relevant to fair use analysis, but these considerations offset one
another in any given case, and so the law provides little ex ante
guidance about the weight a court will assign to such evidence.78
Nature of the Copyrighted Work. The second factor focuses on
whether the work is factual rather than fictional and whether the
work is published or unpublished.79 One function of this factor is to
guard against enlarging the scope of rights in a factual compilation
exploitation of the monopoly privilege that belongs to the owner of the copyright,
noncommercial uses are a different matter.”). The Court defined commercial use as “not
whether the sole motive of the use is monetary gain but whether the user stands to profit
from exploitation of the copyrighted material without paying the customary price.”
Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562 (holding that publishing an excerpt from a biography of
President Ford in advance of publication by another who had the exclusive right was not
fair use).
73. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579, 584–85; see also Pierre N. Leval, Fair Use Rescued,
44 UCLA L. REV. 1449, 1456 (1997) (“[T]he proposition that commercial uses are unfair is
extraordinarily inappropriate and harmful. The heart of fair use lies in commercial
activity.”).
74. See, e.g., Sundeman v. Seajay Soc’y, Inc., 142 F.3d 194, 202–03 (4th Cir. 1998).
75. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (citing Leval, supra note 33, at 1111).
76. See Leval, supra note 33, at 1111 (coining the term “transformative use” and
defining it as a productive use of the material for a different purpose).
77. Id. But see Tushnet, supra note 40, at 559–60 (arguing that the doctrine of
transformative use leads courts to undervalue the expressive importance of copying).
78. See, e.g., Compaq Computer Corp. v. Ergonome Inc., 387 F.3d 403, 411 (5th Cir.
2004) (finding that the evidence supported the jury’s determination of fair use with respect
to a computer manufacturer’s unauthorized commercial use of photographs of proper
hand position to avoid repetitive stress injury in a computer user’s manual); NXIVM
Corp. v. Ross Inst., 364 F.3d 471, 479 (2d Cir. 2004) (finding that the transformative nature
of defendant’s work tipped the first factor in its favor even though the use was commercial
and the copy of plaintiff’s unpublished work was assumed to have been acquired in bad
faith); L.A. News Serv. v. CBS Broad., Inc., 305 F.3d 924, 939–40 (9th Cir. 2002)
(describing uses as having offsetting commercial and transformative properties and
concluding that the first factor “weakly” favors fair use).
79. See, e.g., Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 612 (2d
Cir. 2006).
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beyond the copyrighted selection or arrangement to cover the
uncopyrightable facts.80 Generally, however, this factor serves as a
thumb on the scale in favor of the copyright owner because most
works are deemed creative.81 Even in cases involving factual works,
this factor does little work if the court finds substantial creativity in
the use of facts.82
With respect to publication status, the Supreme Court in Harper
& Row emphasized that the author should retain control over the
initial dissemination of a work, and therefore, unauthorized uses of
unpublished works are less likely to be deemed fair.83 The Court
appeared to have created a presumption against fair use in the case of
unpublished works, and some lower courts appeared to have
rendered this consideration outcome-determinative.84
In 1992,
Congress responded to concerns expressed by the publishing industry
by overruling any interpretations that treated unpublished works as
entitled to a conclusive presumption against fair use.85 Consequently,
the second factor tends to do little work in swaying the outcome of
any fair use inquiry.86
Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used. Copyright law
excuses de minimis unauthorized exercise of a copyright owner’s
80. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 548 (1985)
(stating that the creative element in even factual works has left the law “unsettled” with
regard to the scope of protection for factual works); see also Sony Corp. of Am. v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 496–97 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(stating that factual works lend themselves more to productive use by others).
81. See Wall Data Inc. v. L.A. County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 447 F.3d 769, 780 (9th Cir.
2006); Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 803 (9th Cir. 2003); Dr. Seuss
Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1402 (9th Cir. 1997).
82. Compare Monster Commc’ns, Inc. v. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 935 F. Supp. 490,
495 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding that a film about Muhammad Ali was historical and not
particularly creatively rendered), and Robinson v. Random House, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 830,
841 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (finding that factor two favored the infringer, though the historical
work contained creativity), with Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Bus. Data, Inc.,
166 F.3d 65, 72–73 (2d Cir 1999) (finding the second factor at best neutral because the
work was a creatively expressed news article).
83. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 553 (citations omitted).
84. See Wright v. Warner Books, Inc., 953 F.2d 731, 737 (2d Cir. 1991); New Era
Publ’g Int’l, ApS v. Henry Holt & Co., Inc., 873 F.2d 576, 583 (2d Cir. 1989) (stating that
an unpublished work is usually completely protected); Salinger v. Random House, Inc.,
811 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1987) (same); Sinkler v. Goldsmith, 623 F. Supp. 727, 732 (D. Ariz.
1985) (stating that fair use generally only applies to published works).
85. See Act of Oct. 24, 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-492, 106 Stat. 3145 (codified at 17 U.S.C.
§ 107 (2000)).
86. See, e.g., Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kinderley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 612 (2d
Cir. 2006) (“We recognize, however, that the second factor may be of limited usefulness
where the creative work of art is being used for a transformative purpose.”); Bond v.
Blum, 317 F.3d 385, 395–96 (4th Cir. 2003).
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exclusive rights.87 For purposes of the fair use inquiry, then, the third
factor establishes a sliding scale above the de minimis threshold.88
The focus of the inquiry is on what was taken from the plaintiff’s
work, not on how much of the defendant’s work is comprised of
copied material.89 Theoretically, this factor should weigh increasingly
against the plaintiff as the quantitative amount taken increases.
However, this does not always follow. The third factor must be
weighed with the purpose and character of the use in mind, which can
render even quantitatively large borrowings fair.90 In contrast, the
Harper & Row Court focused on qualitative analysis—whether the
copied portion was the “heart” of the work—which can tip this factor
in the plaintiff’s favor even when the amount taken was quantitatively
insubstantial.91
Effect upon the Potential Market. If copyright is to supply
authors with an economic incentive to create, unauthorized uses that
undermine the incentive by sufficiently reducing the copyright
owner’s ability to profit from the work will be deemed unfair. This
factor will be determinative in rendering run-of-the-mill
infringements, such as the sale of “bootlegged” CDs or DVDs,
unfair.92 However, the analysis under this factor extends beyond the
87. See, e.g., Sandoval v. New Line Cinema Corp., 147 F.3d 215, 217 (2d Cir. 1998);
Ringgold v. Black Entm’t Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 75–77 (2d Cir. 1997); Vault Corp. v.
Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 267–68 (5th Cir. 1988).
88. See Gordon v. Nextel Commc’ns, 345 F.3d 922, 924 (6th Cir. 2003) (“A court will
examine the fair use defense only if the de minimis threshold for actionable copying has
been exceeded.”).
89. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 565 (1985)
(quoting Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 56 (2d Cir. 1936)).
However, if a large portion of the infringing work is copied material, the court may infer
that the copied work is qualitatively substantial. Id.
90. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580, 586–87 (1994) (stating
that the definition of parody requires imitation of the original work to comment upon it).
Compare L.A. News Serv. v. KCAL-TV Channel 9, 108 F.3d 1119, 1122–23 (9th Cir. 1997)
(finding that though KCAL took only a small amount of news footage, it was “all that
mattered”), Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 925–26 (2d Cir. 1994)
(finding that each article within a larger periodical was a separate copyrightable work,
rather than a small portion of one work), and Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g
Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 144 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding that making a Seinfeld quiz book was
entertainment, not criticism, so the amount taken was substantial), with Sundeman v.
Seajay Soc’y, Inc., 142 F.3d 194, 205–06 (4th Cir. 1998) (finding that a substantial portion
of the copyrighted work was not the “heart” of the work, nor was it quantitatively large in
light of the educational purpose).
91. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 564–65 (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v.
Nation Enters., 557 F. Supp. 1067, 1072 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)).
92. See, e.g., United States v. Slater, 348 F.3d 666, 669 (7th Cir. 2003) (finding no
abuse of discretion in refusing a fair use instruction in a criminal trial concerning the
unauthorized distribution of software).
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defendant’s use and beyond the plaintiff’s existing sales and licensing
markets. Instead, the fourth factor can weigh against a finding of fair
use if the use were to become widespread or were to affect the
plaintiff’s potential markets.93
The Court has held that there must be a distinction between
suppressing demand and usurping it.94 Destruction of demand for a
work in the absence of replacing it with copied material is not a
cognizable loss.95 The hard evidentiary questions for courts concern
the likelihood that the defendant’s use might become widespread and
the likelihood that a market will emerge to supply a license or sale for
such use.96
As a doctrinal matter, the status of the fourth factor is contested.
In Harper & Row, the Supreme Court pronounced this factor to be
“undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use.”97 The
Court subsequently retreated, emphasizing again the case-specific
nature of the doctrine and holding that no factor is entitled to
privileged status in fair use analysis.98 Nonetheless, some lower courts
continue to follow the Harper & Row dictum.99
Summary. The broad legal standard set forth in § 107 grants
courts considerable interpretive discretion, and lawmakers have
resisted attempts to cabin this discretion through the use of

93. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 568 (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984)); see also Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 145–46 (finding
that even if the copyright owner would not take advantage of that market, the fact that he
could weighs against fair use); Am. Geophysical, 60 F.3d at 930–31 (finding that since the
licensing of individual articles had become available in the industry, the potential license
fees could be evidence of market harm).
94. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592; see also Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 145 (making the
distinction between parody, which would not be the owner’s market, and tribute, which
would).
95. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591–92.
96. Nunez v. Caribbean Int’l News Corp., 235 F.3d 18, 25 (1st Cir. 2000) (“Surely the
market for professional photographs of models publishable only due to the controversy of
the photograph itself is small or nonexistent.”).
97. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985).
98. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577–78.
99. See, e.g., Mulcahy v. Cheetah Learning LLC, 386 F.3d 849, 854 (8th Cir. 2004);
Bond v. Blum, 317 F.3d 385, 396 (4th Cir. 2003); Sundeman v. Seajay Soc’y, Inc., 142 F.3d
194, 206 (4th Cir. 1998); Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Camp Sys. Int’l, Inc., 428 F. Supp.
2d 1369, 1379 (S.D. Ga. 2006); Hofheinz v. A & E Television Networks, 146 F. Supp. 2d
442, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Dahlen v. Mich. Licensed Beverage Ass’n, 132 F. Supp. 2d 574,
587 (E.D. Mich. 2001); see also Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104, 110 (2d
Cir. 1998) (noting post-Campell lower court inconsistency in treatment of the fourth
factor); Beebe, supra note 36, at 12 (“The data suggest, however, that the factor is nearly
decisive whether it tilts in favor of the plaintiff or the defendant—though, admittedly,
slightly more so when it tilts in favor of the former.”).
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evidentiary presumptions. While this interpretation of fair use leaves
courts free to be sensitive to the nuances of any given case, leading
courts and commentators generally acknowledge that the four-factor
test as interpreted provides very little guidance for predicting whether
a particular use will be deemed fair.100
C.

Judicial Application Adds Little Certainty

Even when courts resist using heuristics such as evidentiary
presumptions to identify fair uses, judicial application of an uncertain
legal standard over time can lead to some predictability for at least a
subset of cases. The conundrum is that most defendants lack
incentives to defend novel fair use interpretations. Indeed, in the face
of the case-specific fair use doctrine and its accompanying
uncertainty, it is reasonable to imagine that users will hesitate to rely
on fair use unless the risk of enforcement appears low. Moreover,
because the penalties for erroneously relying on fair use can be quite
severe,101 even if users adopt a very conservative interpretation of the
doctrine, we should expect that primarily well-resourced users would
be willing to assert fair use rights in litigation. Evidence of how fair
use currently functions supports this view.
There are a range of cases in which the question of fair use
recurs. In a few settings, litigation has provided ex ante certainty
through the emergence of soft fair use rules. The first use is reverse
engineering of software through decompilation or disassembly of
object code for purposes of developing competing or complementary
entertainment products or platforms. The courts have held that
making an intermediate copy of a competitor’s software for purposes
of gaining access to uncopyrightable elements is a fair use so long as
the final product is not substantially similar to the competitor’s.102

100. See 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 34, § 13.05[A][5].
101. See supra notes 53–56 and accompanying text (discussing magnitude of penalties
for copyright infringement).
102. See Sony Computer Entm’t, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 599 (9th Cir.
2000) (holding that intermediate copying for the purpose of reverse engineering
Playstation was a fair use); DSC Commc’n Corp. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 81 F.3d 597, 601 (5th
Cir. 1996); Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1539 n.18 (11th Cir. 1996); Sega
Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1511 (9th Cir. 1992) (original opinion issuing
fair use rule); Mitel, Inc. v. Iqtel, Inc., 896 F. Supp. 1050, 1050–57 (D. Colo. 1995), aff’d on
other grounds, 124 F.3d 1366 (10th Cir. 1997); see also Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne
Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse Engineering, 111 YALE L.J. 1575, 1607–30
(2002) (justifying this fair use rule in terms of economics of reverse engineering in the
software industry).
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This, however, is a narrow rule. In related settings, fair use remains
as uncertain as ever.103
A second soft fair use rule is that personal copying for purposes
of “time shifting” is fair.104 The rationale for this rule would extend to
other forms of private copying, but litigation in relation to these uses
is too sparse to declare the emergence of a soft rule.105 Similarly, it is
probably the case that an Internet search engine’s copying of web
pages for purposes of indexing is either implicitly licensed or is
categorically fair,106 but the case law is not sufficient to declare it so.
Finally, the other clarifying rule is that commercial piracy—wholesale
commercial duplication of a copyrighted work for nonexpressive
purposes—is not a fair use.107 These fair use rules, however, are too
narrow to provide a model for fair use clarification in other settings.
Instead, in order to evaluate whether traditional litigation has
been able to clarify the scope of fair use in the nearly thirty years
since the 1976 Act took effect, this Article considers examples of each
of the favored uses called out in § 107’s preamble beginning with one
of the most frequently litigated fair uses: parody.108
1. Comment or Criticism
As a general matter, using another’s expression for purposes of
comment or criticism often is considered a paradigmatic fair use,109
103. See DSC Commc’n Corp. v. Pulse Commc’n, Inc., 170 F.3d 1354, 1363 (Fed. Cir.
1999) (distinguishing Sega and rejecting fair use defense because “[r]ather than being part
of an attempt at reverse engineering, the copying appears to have been done after
Pulsecom had determined how the system functioned and merely to demonstrate the
interchangeability of the Pulsecom POTS cards with those made and sold by DSC
holding”); Compaq Computer Corp. v. Procom Tech., Inc., 908 F. Supp. 1409, 1421 (S.D.
Tex. 1995) (holding that copying software to duplicate pre-failure warning on its
compatible hard drives was not fair use).
104. See Pamela Samuelson, The Generativity of Sony v. Universal: The Intellectual
Property Legacy of Justice Stevens, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1831, 1863–65 (2006).
105. See id. at 1865–68.
106. Cf. Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that an
Internet search engine’s display of results as “thumbnail” pictures is fair use).
107. See United States v. Slater, 348 F.3d 666, 669 (7th Cir. 2003) (finding no abuse of
discretion in refusing fair use instruction in criminal trial concerning unauthorized
distribution of software); Weissmann v. Freeman, 868 F.2d 1313, 1324 (2d Cir. 1989)
(“[W]here, as here, [defendant’s] use is for the same intrinsic purpose as [plaintiff’s], . . .
such use seriously weakens a claimed fair use.”).
108. See PATRY, supra note 34, at 162–202 (discussing leading parody cases); see also
Beebe, supra note 36, at 5 (showing that almost 10% of district court opinions examined
involved a claim of parody).
109. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, The Place of the User in Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L.
REV. 347, 366 (2005) (identifying parody and print-based criticism as paradigmatic fair
uses).
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particularly when the commentary is directed at the borrowed
work.110 In addition, in cultural conversation, poking fun at, or
criticizing, dominant discourse is commonplace.111 One means of
exercising this freedom is through parody and satire. These forms of
dissent implicate copyright law because they require borrowing
dominant expression in order to be effective.112 Not surprisingly,
copyright owners frequently take offense at parodic borrowings, and
defendants frequently respond that their expression is
quintessentially a fair use.
Some professional parodists appear comfortable relying on fair
use, even with its context-dependent character. For example, those
who produce and distribute comedic television programming such as
Saturday Night Live, South Park, The Simpsons, The Daily Show, and
The Colbert Report, routinely rely on fair use’s protection for parody.
In the case of Saturday Night Live, for example, NBC appears willing
to litigate the occasional legal challenge.113 In contrast, the recording
company that represents “Weird Al” Yankovic, whose profession is
to record parodies of popular songs along with some original
compositions, has chosen to seek licenses and to avoid any reliance on
fair use.114
For those potential fair users who do not make parody a daily
part of their business, the parody cases that have been litigated to
judgment do not supply much in the way of general guidance. To
greatly simplify matters, the essential tension that arises in parody
cases pits the defendant’s creativity in transforming the plaintiff’s
work against the commercial nature of the defendant’s use. If ex ante
clarity could be had in this context, it might be supplied by a
definitive ruling by the highest court in the land. When the Supreme
Court handed down its opinion in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music,

110. Some such uses, such as quotations in book reviews, are recognized as fair uses
and are therefore infrequently litigated. There are, however, quantitative and qualitative
limitations to this principle, as Harper & Row demonstrates.
111. See, e.g., Chi. Bd. of Educ. v. Substance, Inc., 354 F.3d 624, 631 (7th Cir. 2003).
112. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580–81 (1994);
SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1268 (11th Cir. 2001).
113. See, e.g., Elsmere Music, Inc. v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 623 F.2d 252, 253 (2d Cir. 1980)
(per curiam) (holding that Saturday Night Live skit parodying I Love New York
advertising jingle was fair use).
114. See “Weird Al” Yankovic, The Official Website, FAQ, http://www.weirdal.com/
faq.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2007) (“Al does get permission from the original writers of
the songs that he parodies. While the law supports his ability to parody without
permission, he feels it’s important to maintain the relationships that he’s built with artists
and writers over the years.”).
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Inc.,115 some commentators argued that such clarity had been
delivered.116
In 1989, the rap group 2 Live Crew transformed Roy Orbison’s
“Oh, Pretty Woman” into “Big Hairy Woman,” delivering new lyrics
in rap style over the essential musical elements of Orbison’s
composition.117 The group’s manager requested permission to release
the song from Acuff-Rose Music, owner of the copyright in Orbison’s
musical work.118 Acuff-Rose refused permission, and 2 Live Crew
released the song anyway.119 Acuff-Rose filed suit.120
In its opinion, the Court rebuffed attempts to clarify the fair use
inquiry in parody cases through evidentiary presumptions. On the
one hand, the Court declared that a commercial use could not be
deemed presumptively unfair.121 On the other hand, the Court
refused to grant parody a presumption of fairness, while recognizing
that parody requires some use of its target to be effective.122
Moreover, the opinion introduced a material distinction between
parody and satire for fair use purposes.123 Since the song in this case
fell on the parody side of the divide, the case was settled on terms
largely favorable to the parodists after remand.124
For future cases, the Court’s emphasis on context-sensitivity and
the interdependence of the four factors provide little hope for any
certainty. But one could read the Court’s opinion to have created a
reasonably predictable safe harbor for parody applicable at least
115. 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
116. See, e.g., Leval, supra note 73, at 1465–66 (extolling the virtues of Campbell in
paring back harmful dicta and refocusing the inquiry in parody cases on whether the
defendant’s parody supersedes or transforms the plaintiff’s work).
117. See Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 754 F. Supp. 1150, 1158–59 (M.D. Tenn.
1991), rev’d, 972 F.2d 1429 (6th Cir. 1992), rev’d, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510
U.S. 569 (1994).
118. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 572.
119. Id. at 573. 2 Live Crew did credit the songwriters and the publisher. Id.
120. See id.
121. See id. at 584–85.
122. See id. at 581 (“The Act has no hint of an evidentiary preference for parodists
over their victims, and no workable presumption for parody could take account of the fact
that parody often shades into satire when society is lampooned through its creative
artifacts, or that a work may contain both parodic and nonparodic elements. Accordingly,
parody, like any other use, has to work its way through the relevant factors, and be judged
case by case, in light of the ends of the copyright law.”).
123. See id. at 580–81 (“Parody needs to mimic an original to make its point, and so has
some claim to use the creation of its victim’s (or collective victims’) imagination, whereas
satire can stand on its own two feet and so requires justification for the very act of
borrowing.”).
124. See Associated Press, Acuff-Rose Settles Suit with Rap Group, MEMPHIS COM.
APPEAL, June 5, 1996, at A14.
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when the target of the parody is the copyrighted work and when the
parodist has not taken “too much.”125 Although each of these
elements also has fuzzy boundaries, this rule of thumb would seem to
make it easier to conduct ex ante fair use analysis.
To test this hypothesis, consider how you, as legal adviser, would
apply fair use under the following circumstances taken from two
actual cases. Unlike the actual users, however, in this hypothetical
your client is an academic press that is willing to publish the following
two books only if, in your opinion as counsel, there is a seventy-five
percent or better chance that a court would grant summary judgment
in favor of fair use in the event that the publisher were sued. In each
case, parody would be your best argument.
Book 1. The story, The Wind Done Gone, appropriates the
characters, plot and major scenes from Margaret Mitchell’s iconic
novel Gone with the Wind. In The Wind Done Gone, the author, an
African-American woman, tells the story of the antebellum South
through the eyes of Cyanara, who is Scarlett O’Hara’s mixed-race
half-sister and full-time lover of Rhett Butler.126 The significant
narrative elements from Gone with the Wind are all transformed to
dramatically alter the relative strengths and nuances of the AfricanAmerican and white characters, and a number of relationships from
the original have been reimagined. For example, the character
Ashley Wilkes is rendered as a gay man. For this reason, among
others, there is no chance that the Mitchell estate would grant a
license to publish this work.127 Is fair use as applied to parody
sufficiently clear that you would advise your client to publish the
book?
Book 2. The author has written a book entitled The Cat NOT in
the Hat: A Parody by Dr. Juice, which tells the tale of the O.J.
Simpson trial (noncopyrightable facts) in the style of Theodor
Geisel’s (a.k.a. Dr. Seuss’s) Cat in the Hat. Recall that the Seuss
original is a morality tale about a brother and sister’s mishaps when
visited by the Cat in the Hat while their mother is away. In the Cat
NOT in the Hat, the graphic elements of the original are borrowed
and samples of the text are as follows:
125. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 589 (suggesting that if a substantial portion of a parody
is composed of verbatim copying, the parody will have borrowed too much to be fair use).
126. See SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1267 (11th Cir. 2001).
127. See id. at 1270 & n.26 (“[I]t is evident from the record evidence that SunTrust
makes a practice of requiring authors of its licensed derivatives to make no references to
homosexuality.”); see also id. at 1282 (Marcus, J., concurring) (arguing that unwillingness
to license should influence the fourth fair use factor).
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A happy town
Inside L.A.
Where rich folks play
The day away.
But under the moon
The 12th of June.
Two victims flail
Assault! Assail!
Somebody will go to jail!
Who will it be?
Oh my! Oh me!128
and the tale ends:
JUICE
+ST
JUSTICE
Hmm . . . take the word JUICE.
Then add ST.
Between the U and I, you see.
And then you have JUSTICE.
Or maybe you don’t.
Maybe we will.
And maybe we won’t.
’Cause if the Cat didn’t do it?
Then who? Then who?
Was it him?
Was it her?
Was it me?
Was it you?
Oh me! Oh my!
Oh my! Oh me!
The murderer is running free.129
Assume again the same conditions. Is the parody defense sufficiently
strong to advise publication?
Most readers probably feel ill-equipped to answer these
questions without seeing the entirety of the works in question—
raising the costs of your legal advice. After reading the full works,
many copyright lawyers would probably conclude that the case for
fair use is stronger for Book 1 than it is for Book 2. But, when faced
with the risk-averse conditions posed in the hypothetical questions,
128. Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1401 (9th Cir.
1997) (quoting Cat in the Hat).
129. Id. at 1402.
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many copyright lawyers probably would be unwilling to give the client
sufficient assurance for publication to go forward even after the
Supreme Court’s Campbell opinion was handed down.
If one reads Campbell to have provided a parody safe harbor, in
each case, arguments can be made about both the targeting and the
amount of borrowing. For the first book, the case for targeting of
Mitchell’s original is clearer, but the amount borrowed is also quite
extensive. In the second book, the argument for targeting is more
strained, but one can make the case that the narrative contrasts the
relative harmlessness of Geisel’s trickster figure with a presumed
guilty Simpson.130 In addition, the amount borrowed is relatively
small. The graphic character of the cat is the most significant
borrowing because the story is comprised of public domain facts, and
Geisel’s estate does not own a copyright in the meter of his rhymes.
Moreover, in each of these cases, and in Campbell itself, the
relationship between white and black Americans lurks as a relevant
but ambiguous consideration.131
Litigation of parody cases provides some ex ante guidance about
fair use, and it arguably has created a simplified safe harbor analysis
for the parody context. Even with these benefits, uncertainty remains
a problem sufficient to chill risk-averse users such as our hypothetical
academic press. Indeed, we have these examples only because they
are drawn from actual post-Campbell cases that involved commercial
publishers with a greater tolerance for risk than was posed in the
hypothetical.
In the first case, SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co.,132 the
Eleventh Circuit reversed a preliminary injunction that would have
prohibited publication of The Wind Done Gone.133 The appellate
court did not rule on the merits, but remanded with extensive analysis
leaning notably in favor of defendant’s fair use defense.134 With the
130. Although Simpson was acquitted of criminal charges for the murder of his wife, a
civil jury found by a preponderance of the evidence that he was guilty. See Todd S.
Purdum, The Simpson Verdict: The Reaction; Simpson Verdict Confronts a Public
Seemingly Numbed, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1997, at A1.
131. The role that race relations plays in these cases is difficult to parse. One senses a
certain degree of solicitude from the courts in Campbell and SunTrust Bank toward the
African-American defendants’ respective motivations for commenting on or criticizing
iconically “white” works. In contrast, in Dr. Seuss, the court did not fully disguise its
distaste for the intermingling of an iconic children’s book with the racially charged
Simpson case.
132. 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001).
133. See SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 136 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1386 (N.D. Ga.
2001), rev’d, 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001).
134. See SunTrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1260–77.
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writing on the wall, the Mitchell estate later settled.135 In the second
case, Dr. Seuss Enterprises, L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc.,136 the
Ninth Circuit upheld a preliminary injunction on the grounds that the
work fell on the wrong side of Campbell’s parody/satire distinction
because the book did not aim its commentary or ridicule at the Dr.
Seuss original.137
As one might imagine, potential fair users with fewer resources
and/or greater risk aversion than the defendants in these two cases
would be far more likely to forgo a fair use in the face of potential
litigation. We have some evidence to support this theory. In the mid1990s, the growth of the world wide web opened the gates to poorly
financed speakers to publish parodies cheaply and easily. However,
legal uncertainty surrounding fair use, coupled with the Copyright
Act’s so-called notice-and-takedown regime,138 led to a retreat from
reliance on fair use in a number of cases. The most notable of these
may be Mark Napier’s Distorted Barbie site in which he sought to
subvert the cultural meaning associated with Mattel’s doll.139 Mattel
The evidence
responded aggressively, and Napier relented.140
concerning the social costs of fair use uncertainty in the parody
context is mixed, however, because other parodists have been willing
to litigate to resist Mattel’s unreasonably aggressive copyright claims
in relation to Barbie.141 Nonetheless, to the extent that the parody
cases provide any guidance, it does not carry over to related forms of
commentary. For example, if the parody cases demonstrate the

135. See David D. Kirkpatrick, Mitchell Estate Settles “Gone With the Wind” Suit, N.Y.
TIMES, May 10, 2002, at C6 (reporting the settlement and summarizing the case).
136. 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997).
137. See id. at 1403.
138. See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2000) (providing safe harbor to online service providers who
store infringing material at the direction of a user subject to the condition that the
provider remove material alleged to be infringing when given proper notice).
139. See The Distorted Barbie, http://users.rcn.com/napier.interport/barbie/barbie.html
(last visited Mar. 26, 2007) (telling the story of Distorted Barbie).
140. See id.
141. See Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 805–06 (9th Cir. 2003)
(affirming summary judgment of fair use to photographer who depicted nude Barbies
imperiled by household appliances); Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., No. CV998543RSWL (RSX), 2004 WL 1454100, at *2 (C.D. Cal. June 21, 2004) (on remand,
awarding defendant photographer attorneys’ fees because Mattel’s copyright infringement
claim was objectively unreasonable and was brought to force defendant into costly
litigation in order to dissuade him from lawful use of Barbie’s image); see also Mattel, Inc.
v. Pitt, 229 F. Supp. 2d 315, 324–25 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (denying Mattel’s motion for summary
judgment because of defendant’s fair use defense).
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protection fair use supplies when one talks back to culture, the
doctrine is far less reliable for those who talk about culture.142
2. Educational Uses
If the oft-litigated issue of parody remains uncertain ex ante, a
second candidate for fair use clarity might be educational uses. Even
with the courts’ well-established allergy to fair use presumptions, one
might give some weight to the fact that half of the purposes that
Congress identified as signaling a fair use in § 107 are educationrelated: “teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use),
scholarship, or research.”143 However, although educational purposes
gain favor in the analysis under the first fair use factor (nature and
purpose of use), the situation is complicated under the fourth factor
(harm to the market) because educational publishers have developed
markets for many educational uses of copyrighted works.144 Courts
faced with educational fair use cases have thus been conflicted about
whether the educator’s favored purpose or the publisher’s market
interest should prevail.145

142. In a number of cases, defendants who have created derivative works based on
culturally iconic works erroneously relied on fair use, notwithstanding the transformative
nature of their works. See Ty, Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 81 F. Supp. 2d 899, 906–07 (N.D.
Ill. 2000) (holding that books about Beanie Babies that used descriptions and photos were
not a fair use), rev’d, 292 F.3d 512 (7th Cir. 2002); see also Toho Co., Ltd. v. William
Morrow & Co., Inc., 33 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1217 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (holding that a book
chronicling Godzilla movies was not a fair use); Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Carol Publ’g
Group, Inc., 11 F. Supp. 2d 329, 337 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding that a book about Star Trek
with episode summaries and other material was not a fair use), aff’d, 181 F.3d 83 (2d Cir.
1999); Castle Rock Entm’t v. Carol Publ’g Group, 955 F. Supp. 260, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(finding that a quiz book about the Seinfeld television program was not a fair use), aff’d,
150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998); Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l, 778 F. Supp. 1247,
1251 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that a book about the television program Twin Peaks was
not a fair use), aff’d in part, 996 F.2d 1366 (2d Cir. 1993).
The courts found each of these books to endanger the copyright holder’s market
for similar tributes to their popular characters. See Ty, 81 F. Supp. 2d at 906; Toho, 33 F.
Supp. 2d at 1217–18; Paramount, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 336; Castle Rock, 955 F. Supp. at 272;
Twin Peaks Prods., 778 F. Supp. at 1251.
143. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000); see also Fisher, supra note 40, at 1770 (noting that “a
suspicion persists among many students of the [fair use] doctrine that educational activities
should stand on a somewhat different footing from other kinds of uses”).
144. See, e.g., Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1384
(6th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (describing part of the academic publishing market).
145. For example, in the “copy shop” cases two courts have held that a copy shop that
makes “multiple copies for classroom use” for profit is not making a fair use of the work.
See Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
However, an educational institution that produces course packs and sells them at cost may
well be engaged in fair use, depending upon the regularity of the use and the amount
copied from each work.
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Nevertheless, because educators and students must use a wide
range of resources that lie within copyright law’s domain, educational
institutions have a strong interest in fair use clarification. In response
to the uncertainty this section is documenting, these institutions have
resorted to a patchwork of strategies. For example, in the course of
codifying fair use in the 1976 Copyright Act and subsequently,
educational institutions negotiated with copyright owners, at times
under the urging of Congress, to set forth rule-like guidelines that
would establish safe harbors.146 These guidelines do provide clarity
for a subset of educational uses, but, because these guidelines serve
only as a floor,147 many colorable fair uses fall outside their ambit and
remain subject to the standard four-factor uncertainty.
Consequently, in higher education, university counsel and
university librarians often must field a dizzying array of fair use
inquiries. Some counsel’s offices or libraries have responded with
fairly detailed guidance available on the web.148 Notable among these
146. See generally Kenneth D. Crews, The Law of Fair Use and the Illusion of Fair-Use
Guidelines, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 599 (2001) (discussing these attempts and their drawbacks).
Most of these attempts have resulted in fair use “guidelines.” The most prominent of
these have been:
(1) H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 68–70 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5681–83; see also PATRY, supra note 34, at 344–59 (providing draft materials
leading up to guidelines).
(2) H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 70–71 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5683–84.
(3) H.R. REP. NO. 97-495, at 8–9 (1982). These guidelines first appeared in 127
CONG. REC. 24,048, 24,048–49 (1981).
(4) CONTU Guidelines on Photocopying Under Interlibrary Loan Arrangements,
in FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL
USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS 54–55 (1978).
(5) Bruce A. Lehman, Information Infrastructure Task Force, Proposal for
Educational Fair Use Guidelines for Digital Images, in CONFERENCE ON FAIR
USE: FINAL REPORT TO THE COMMISSIONER ON THE CONCLUSION OF THE
CONFERENCE ON FAIR USE 33–41 (1998) [hereinafter CONFU FINAL REPORT].
(6) Proposal for Educational Fair Use Guidelines for Distance Learning, in
CONFU FINAL REPORT, supra, at 43–48.
(7) Proposal for Fair Use Guidelines for Educational Multimedia, in CONFU
FINAL REPORT, supra, at 49–59; see also STAFF OF H. SUBCOMM. ON COURTS &
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OF THE H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 104TH CONG.,
FAIR USE GUIDELINES FOR EDUCATIONAL MULTIMEDIA (Comm. Print 1996).
For a discussion of the origins of this Multimedia Committee Print and its relation
to the CONFU Final Report, see Crews, supra, at 638 nn.215–16, 676 n.431.
147. See Crews, supra note 146, at 668–69.
148. See, e.g., American Association of Law Libraries, AALL Guidelines on the Fair
Use of Copyrighted Works by Law Libraries, http://www.aallnet.org/about/policy_fair.asp
(last visited Feb. 25, 2007); Copyright Management Center, Fair Use Issues, http://
copyright.iupui.edu/fairuse.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2007); Stanford University Libraries,
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responses is the position adopted by the Office of General Counsel at
the University of Texas, which has issued its own fair use rules of
thumb.149 In addition, the American Library Association employs a
specialist responsible for fielding fair use inquiries and for providing
general responses. Examples of the myriad endeavors plagued by fair
use uncertainty to which she has responded include whether creating
a computer program that explains the answers to math book
problems is allowed;150 whether a student’s freehand drawings of
copyrighted characters can be put into a school magazine;151 whether
student-made videos containing commercial music and video clips
may be shown on the school’s closed-circuit television station,152 and
whether a library can put images of covers of recommended books on
its children’s website.153
These issues highlight the run-of-the-mill fair use uncertainty
that darkens campuses across the country on a daily basis. The
transition to a digital environment manifestly increases the expressive
costs of this uncertainty, which now touches upon systematic uses of
Copyright & Fair Use, http://fairuse.stanford.edu/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2007); University of
Maryland University College, Copyright and Fair Use in the Classroom, on the Internet,
and the World Wide Web, http://www.umuc.edu/library/copy.shtml (last visited Feb. 25,
2007); see also North Carolina Department of Public Instruction, Copyright in an
Electronic Environment, http://www.dpi.state.nc.us/copyright1.html (last visited Feb. 25,
2007) (providing guidelines for K-12 setting).
149. See Office of General Counsel, supra note 1. The Office of General Counsel’s
website describes the decision to draft the guidelines:
We have reviewed all the [negotiated] Guidelines and have decided to take a
different approach to protecting our component institutions and our faculty, staff
and students from the dangers of the no-man’s land while supporting our exercise
of fair use rights. We call our approach “Rules of Thumb” for the Fair Use of
Copyrighted Materials. Like the Guidelines from which they are in some cases
derived, the Rules of Thumb are tailored to different uses of others’ works. But
unlike the Guidelines, they are short, concise, and easy to read. And they are part
of a larger strategy to meet our needs for permission when fair use is not enough;
to reduce our need for permission in the future by licensing comprehensive access
to works; and to take a more active role in the management of the copyrighted
works created on our campuses for the benefit of our university community.
Id.
150. See Carrie Russell, Carrie on Copyright: A Tale of Two Textbooks, SCH. LIBR. J.,
June 1, 2003, at 41 (Carrie Russell, the American Library Association’s copyright expert
answers questions on fair use, but states that her opinions should not be taken as legal
advice).
151. See Carrie Russell, Carrie on Copyright: Imitating the Masters, SCH. LIBR. J., Sept.
1, 2002, at 39.
152. See Carrie Russell, Carrie on Copyright: Television Test, SCH. LIBR. J., Apr. 1,
2002, at 43.
153. See Carrie Russell, Carrie on Copyright: Is It a Crime To Copy?, SCH. LIBR. J.,
Jan. 1, 2002, at 41.
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copyrighted works. A harbinger for this development is the
controversy that has emerged between the Association of American
Publishers and the University of California at San Diego over the
university’s “electronic reserve system.”154 The school has developed
a new system through which students acquire required reserve
materials online with a password rather than by going to the library to
read books held on reserve.155
The publishers believe that this practice more closely resembles
commercial “course packs,” which courts have found not to be a fair
use.156 The university believes that this use is the functional
equivalent of a lawful analog use157 and that any suit by publishers
would be futile and a public relations disaster.158 However, other
institutions are less willing to rely on fair use for fear of litigation
costs.159 A range of other educational fair use disputes that have
arisen, or are likely to arise, in the digital transition are further
highlighted in a recently released white paper, The Digital Learning
Challenge: Obstacles to Educational Uses of Copyrighted Material in
the Digital Age.160 As these emerge, demand for a procedure to
clarify fair use will intensify.
3. News Reporting
Finally, those engaged in news reporting face as much or more
uncertainty as do social commentators and educational users. News
reporting is not entitled to a presumption of fairness, of course.161 As
is the case with educational uses, fair use analysis must mitigate the
tension between promoting favored uses while limiting the
deleterious effects of such uses on markets for news items. Whereas
154. See Scott Carlson, Legal Battle Brews over Availability of Texts on Online Reserve
at U. of California Library, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Apr. 22, 2005, at A36.
155. See id.
156. See supra note 145.
157. Traditional course reserves rely upon the first sale doctrine, see 17 U.S.C. § 109
(2000), and/or fair use to make materials available to students. The ways in which fair use
must substitute for first sale in the digital age is an important subject that lies beyond the
scope of this Article.
158. See Carlson, supra note 154, at A36.
159. See id. (quoting Jonathan Franklin, fair use scholar and associate law librarian at
the University of Washington).
160. WILLIAM W. FISHER & WILLIAM MCGEVERAN, BERKMAN CTR. FOR INTERNET
& SOC’Y, HARVARD LAW SCH., THE DIGITAL LEARNING CHALLENGE: OBSTACLES TO
EDUCATIONAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL IN THE DIGITAL AGE (2006), http://
cyber.law.harvard.edu/media/projects/education. Disclosure: I was a consultant for the
project that produced this paper.
161. See, e.g., Nunez v. Caribbean Int’l News Corp., 235 F.3d 18, 22–23 (1st Cir. 2000)
(finding no presumption in favor of news reporting).
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most educational institutions are organized on a not-for-profit basis,
most news gathering and news reporting organizations are for profit.
This distinction at times further complicates fair use analysis in news
reporting cases.
Journalists and documentary filmmakers who have been brave
enough to rely on fair use face sparse and somewhat inconsistent
precedent. To be sure, courts have been willing on occasion to find a
journalistic use to be fair as a matter of law, particularly when the
plaintiff seeks to use copyright law to squelch negative publicity
rather than to directly protect an economic interest.162 On the other
hand, in several cases, courts have found that using copyrighted
material in news reports or articles is not fair use, finding that news
organizations are commercial entities that have harmed the copyright
holder’s market for the material.163
For example, the odd copyright career of the videotaped beating
of Reginald Denny during the Los Angeles riots of 1992 highlights
the uncertainty that fair use poses for television news. The fair use
defense failed for use of the video clip without permission for
purposes of news reporting of the event by competing news outlets.164
However, use of the video in connection with news reporting of the
attackers’ trial was deemed fair.165
162. See, e.g., Payne v. Courier-Journal, Nos. 05-5942, 05-6066, 2006 WL 2075345, at
*1–3 (6th Cir. July 25, 2006) (unpublished opinion affirming that the newspaper’s
quotations from an unpublished children’s book in connection with the author’s
subsequent imprisonment for rape was fair use).
163. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985)
(holding that The Nation’s “scooping” of Time magazine’s exclusive right to first publish
President Ford’s memoir was not a fair use); Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Bus.
Data, Inc., 166 F.3d 65, 72–73 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that translating Japanese news
articles into “abstracts” that were then sold was not a fair use); Iowa State Univ. Research
Found., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 621 F.2d 57, 61–62 (2d Cir. 1980) (finding ABC’s purpose
in airing a biography of an Olympic athlete to be commercial and to have harmed a
significant potential market); Richard Feiner & Co., Inc. v. H.R. Indus., Inc., 10 F. Supp.
2d 310, 314 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (finding the use of a single still of a copyrighted movie in an
article was not fair use), rev’d on other grounds, 182 F.3d 901 (2d Cir. 1999).
164. L.A. News Serv. v. Reuters Television Int’l, Ltd., 149 F.3d 987, 992–94 (9th Cir.
1998) (holding that Reuters distribution of copies of copyrighted Reginald Denny beating
video to subscribers was not fair use); L.A. News Serv. v. KCAL-TV Channel 9, 108 F.3d
1119, 1120–22 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that showing Reginald Denny video on the news
without license was not fair use).
165. See L.A. News Serv. v. CBS Broad., Inc., 305 F.3d 924, 938–42 (9th Cir. 2002)
(holding that use of brief Denny beating clips to promote coverage of attackers’ trial was a
fair use). Postings of the video on the YouTube website have drawn a new lawsuit, but
this issue of fair use is unlikely to be litigated. See Greg Sandoval, YouTube Sued over
Copyright Infringement, CNET NEWS, July 18, 2006, http://news.com.com/YouTube+sued+
over+copyright+infringement/2100-1030_3-6095736.html?tag=nl.
Although YouTube
could conceivably raise a fair use defense, almost certainly the primary issue will be
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Documentary film can also be a form of news reporting.
Broadcasters and film distributors have greater lead time to evaluate
fair use with this form of reportage than do those who report the daily
news. This lead time appears to work against the role of fair use,
however, because gatekeepers routinely demand clearance for most
or all uses of copyrighted works without engaging in fair use
analysis.166
Professors Pat Aufderheide and Peter Jaszi report in Untold
Stories: Creative Consequences of the Rights Clearance Culture for
Documentary Filmmakers,167 that a number of documentary
filmmakers have been chilled in their expressive choices by an
inability to rely upon their fair use rights. A few samples include the
following fair use quotations from their report:
When Linda Goode Bryant was working on Flag Wars, a
documentary chronicling conflict between African-Americans
and newly-arrived gay and lesbians in a gentrifying area, she
had to sacrifice a scene involving a principal character, Linda
Mitchell. Mitchell was singing along with the radio while
painting her front porch. . . . After consulting with public TV
documentary series POV staffers and Sony, the music
publisher, the consensus was that ultimately the
musician/songwriter would be uncooperative and to just cut the
scene. “It was a shame, because it was a moment which really
showed an aspect of her character which was important.”168
....
“I haven’t used fair use in the last ten years, because from
the point of view of any broadcast or cable network, there is no
such thing as fair use,” said Jeffrey Tuchman. “I’m not
speaking here of news networks. Every headline I use, even
historical headline, even without news photographs, even
without the masthead, every magazine cover, I have to get the
whether YouTube fits within the remedial safe harbor set forth in 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)
(2000) for online service providers that store copyrighted material at the direction of a
user.
166. See generally KEITH AOKI ET AL., BOUND BY LAW (2006), available at http://
www.law.duke.edu/cspd/comics/digital.html (using the format of graphic novels to explain
difficulties faced by documentarians in clearing rights and obstacles to exercising fair use
rights).
167. PATRICIA AUFDERHEIDE & PETER JASZI, CTR. FOR SOC. MEDIA, UNTOLD
STORIES: CREATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF THE RIGHTS CLEARANCE CULTURE FOR
DOCUMENTARY FILMMAKERS (2006), available at http://www.centerforsocialmedia.org/
files/pdf/UNTOLDSTORIES_Report.pdf.
168. Id. at 18.
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Everyone is fearful of rights issues on every

D. Absence of Procedures To Clarify Fair Use
The uncertainty that prevails even in litigated settings makes the
costs and risks associated with relying on the fair use doctrine
problematic for many users. Enforcement strategies have intensified
the pressure.170 For example, in some industries, customs and trade
practices once recognized certain kinds of uses as fair, supplying
sufficient certainty to exercise fair use rights for commercial works.171
That has now changed. Legal departments and licensing agents in
companies with large portfolios of copyrighted works have been less
willing to acknowledge fair uses in the atmosphere of fear and greed
that the advent of new production and distribution technologies has
bred.172 Nowhere has this trend been more noticeable than in the
music and film industries.173
From the perspective of expressive freedom, the response to this
new aggression has not been encouraging. In a few cases, strong
lawyers are willing to advise that a contemplated use is likely to be
judged fair, or artists are willing to proceed from a fair use position.174
In the main, however, lawyers are unwilling or unable to provide
sufficient assurance, or clients are unwilling or financially unable to
risk proceeding from a fair use position. Making matters worse is a
situation roughly analogous to that posed by Arrow’s information
paradox:175 a potential fair user who seeks to acquire better
information about the risks of relying on fair use by asking the
169. Id. at 25.
170. See Patry & Posner, supra note 32, at 1654–59 (describing incidents of copyright
overclaiming).
171. See AUFDERHEIDE & JASZI, supra note 167, at 24; HEINS & BECKLES, supra note
38, at 5–6.
172. See HEINS & BECKLES, supra note 38, at 5–6; Wagner, supra note 38, at 427–31
(describing why increased fair use uncertainty prompted by technological change has
caused copyright owners to adopt a more hostile stance toward fair use).
173. See HEINS & BECKLES, supra note 38, at 5 (describing the rise of a clearance
culture in the music and film industries).
174. See, e.g., Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 608–15
(2d Cir. 2006) (successfully relying on fair use for unauthorized reproduction of concert
posters); Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 799–806 (9th Cir. 2003)
(successfully relying on fair use for transformative uses of Barbie dolls).
175. Arrow’s information paradox is that information cannot be evaluated by a
potential buyer until it is disclosed, but disclosure destroys the buyer’s motivation to pay
because he or she already has acquired it. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and
the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE
ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 614–16 (Richard R. Nelson ed., 1962).
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copyright owner whether it would be willing to grant permission or a
royalty-based license for the contemplated use thereby compromises
his or her fair use position.176 As a result, potential fair users
generally choose between suffering expressive harms by forgoing
their desired uses or acquiescing in licensing demands that further
goad aggressive legal and licensing departments into making license
demands for fair uses.
If post hoc litigation is too risky, one might ask whether some
form of anticipatory adjudication might be available to a determined
fair user. In contemporary copyright law, the principal procedure
available is a suit for a declaratory judgment. This option is subject to
stringent limitations. The federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction
over copyright claims.177 Article III of the U.S. Constitution178 and
the federal Declaratory Judgment Act179 require a case or controversy
to have arisen for the court to have subject matter jurisdiction. As a
176. The fair use conundrum is only a rough analogy because asking for a license
prejudices, but does not destroy, the user’s fair use case. Cf. Gibson, supra note 30, at
884–86 (reviewing law and commentary on when a foregone license counts as harm to
market). The prejudice to the fair use case may not be self-evident. If the copyright
owner refuses categorically to negotiate a license, the case for fair use may be
strengthened. See SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1282 (11th Cir.
2001) (Marcus, J., concurring) (arguing that unwillingness to license should influence the
fourth fair use factor).
However, if the copyright owner is willing to quote a price or at least enter into
negotiations, this fact could influence a court’s harm-to-the-market inquiry. See, e.g., Am.
Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 926–32 (2d Cir. 1994) (rejecting fair use
defense for selective photocopying of science journal articles on grounds that journal
publishers had created a licensing market for such photocopying); OFFICE OF LEGAL
COUNSEL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, WHETHER AND UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES
GOVERNMENT REPRODUCTION OF COPYRIGHTED MATERIALS IS A NONINFRINGING
“FAIR USE” UNDER SECTION 107 OF THE COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1976 (1999), available at
http://usdoj.gov/olc/pincusfinal430.htm (“[I]f government agencies routinely agree to pay
licensing fees to engage in photocopying practices that were fair uses at the time, there is a
chance some courts may conclude that a growing or longstanding custom of paying such
fees weighs against a finding that such photocopying practices are fair uses when
unlicensed. Thus, an agency that decides to negotiate a photocopying license should seek
to limit the scope of the licensing agreement so as not to cover those photocopying
practices that the agency, in good faith, concludes are not infringing.”). Moreover,
although intent is not formally an element of fair use analysis, as a practical matter, it
often is. See NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Inst., 364 F.3d 471, 478–79 (2d Cir. 2004); Rogers v.
Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 309 (2d Cir. 1992); Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 436–38 (9th Cir.
1986); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1231,
1244 n.14 (N.D. Cal. 1995); Shady Records, Inc. v. Source Enters., Inc., No. 03 Civ. 9944
(GEL), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26143, at *60–62 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2005).
177. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (2000).
178. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (extending federal judicial power to a range of cases and
controversies).
179. Declaratory Judgment Act, ch. 512, 48 Stat. 955 (1934) (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. §§ 2201–02 (2000)).
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practical matter, the declaratory judgment route is available to a fair
user only after a user has made an investment in use of the
copyrighted work and is preparing to distribute it publicly, and when
a copyright owner has made a sufficiently specific and credible threat
of litigation.180
Potential fair users who seek ex ante guidance through a
declaratory judgment proceeding are likely to find this approach
unavailing.
For example, a group calling itself the Ad-Hoc
Committee for the Investigation and Exposé of Multiculturalism
sought to publish and distribute a parody of a group of works by
author and poet Haki Madhubuti.181 The Committee sent letters of
inquiry along with a copy of its parody to Madhubuti and to
publishers of the relevant works seeking their acknowledgement that
the contemplated parody would be a fair use or would otherwise be
permissible. The recipients did not respond. The Committee filed for
a declaratory judgment arguing that silence was an intentional act
“ ‘to exploit the chilling effect of the Copyright Act.’ ”182
Unsurprisingly, the court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.183
In sum, as a matter of doctrine, fair use plays an essential role in
brokering expressive freedoms among first-generation authors and
their successors.
In practice, however, fair use uncertainty
undermines the doctrine’s ability to function as advertised. The high
costs associated with interpreting standards and the financial risks
associated with relying on fair use greatly limit the degree to which
those who produce works for public consumption are willing to rely
on fair use.
II. FIXING FAIR USE: A PROPOSAL
Copyright law must supply copyright owners with sufficient
means to enforce their rights against commercial piracy while
securing to users their necessary freedoms to use the copyrighted
works of others under certain circumstances. Regrettably, copyright
law currently is not up to the task. The time has come to fix fair use.

180. See Diagnostic Unit Inmate Council v. Films Inc., 88 F.3d 651, 653 (8th Cir. 1996)
(setting forth declaratory judgment standard for copyright cases); see also Clean Flicks of
Colo., LLC v. Soderbergh, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1238–40 (D. Colo. 2006) (declaratory
judgment case involving works already created and distributed).
181. See Ad-Hoc Comm. for the Investigation & Exposé of Multiculturalism v.
Madhubuti, No. 93 C 1354, 1993 WL 75103, at *1–2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 15, 1993).
182. Id. at *2 (quoting complaint).
183. Id.
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There are four options for overcoming the problems caused by
fair use uncertainty: (1) reduce the costs of obtaining a fair use
determination ex ante under the current legal standard; (2) reduce
the ex post penalties for misjudging fair use in good faith; (3) sharpen
the fuzzy edges of the doctrine by establishing clearly delineated safe
harbors or by making the entire doctrine more rule-like; or
(4) implement a combination of these measures.
This Article argues that the first approach is best, and this Part
advances a legislative proposal to achieve ex ante fair use clarification
through administrative adjudication. After introducing the proposal,
this Part shows how it would greatly improve the functioning of
copyright law and then responds to the likely legal and policy
arguments that would be advanced in opposition.
A. Description of the Proposal
Congress should extend the advisory opinion function available
in other bodies of federal law to copyright law by amending the
Copyright Act to create a Fair Use Board in the U.S. Copyright
Office. Fair use judges would have the authority and the obligation
to consider petitions for a fair use ruling on a contemplated or actual
use of a copyrighted work. The copyright owner would receive notice
of the petition and would have the opportunity to participate in the
proceeding.
If the fair use judge determines that such a use is or would be a
fair use, the petitioner and the petitioner’s heirs or assigns would be
immune from liability for copyright infringement for such use. Such a
ruling would not affect the copyright owner’s rights and remedies
with respect to any other parties or any other uses of the copyrighted
work by the petitioner. If the judge rules that such use is not, or
would not be, a fair use, the petitioner retains all other defenses to
copyright infringement. In either case, the judge’s determination
would be administratively reviewable by the Register of Copyrights.
The Register’s decisions would be reviewable de novo in the federal
circuit courts of appeals.
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1. The Fair Use Board
a.

Selection and Composition

The Fair Use Board would be an analog to the recently created
Copyright Royalty Board.184 The Fair Use Board initially should be
comprised of a chief judge and two associate judges. The Board’s
composition could then be adjusted with experience. As is the case
with copyright royalty judges, members of the Fair Use Board should
be appointed by the Librarian of Congress in consultation with the
Register of Copyrights. Ideally, fair use judges would be impartial,
efficient, and wise. However, impartiality would be difficult to
achieve. As a practical matter, members of the Fair Use Board
should be lawyers with demonstrated experience in copyright law.
This requirement is likely to skew the applicant pool toward
applicants that have represented primarily copyright owners, which,
in turn, is likely to skew their understanding of the scope of fair use.
This is an unavoidable feature of this proposal. Even with a
cramped understanding of fair use, members of the Fair Use Board
would be obliged to rule against blatant overreaching by copyright
owners. A related risk is the potential careerist bias judges are likely
to exhibit. Fair use judges with an eye toward returning to practice
would have strong incentives to render rulings favorable to copyright
owners. To minimize this risk, I propose that fair use judges agree to
serve for six-year renewable terms subject to review. Fair use judges
would be subject to dismissal only for cause. As part of the renewal
procedure, the public would be invited by notice to comment on a
judge’s impartiality and productivity. Given the experimental nature
184. See Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-419,
118 Stat. 2341 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 801–05 (Supp. IV 2004)). Under the Act, the
copyright royalty judges will conduct proceedings to “make determinations and
adjustments of reasonable terms and rates of royalty payments as provided in [Copyright
Act] sections 112(e), 114, 115, 116, 118, 119 and 1004,” “to make determinations
concerning the adjustment of the copyright royalty rates under [Copyright Act] section
111,” to authorize distributions under sections 111, 119, and 1007 of the Act, and “[t]o
determine the status of a digital audio recording device or a digital audio interface device
under sections 1002 and 1003, as provided in section 1010.” Id. § 3 (codified at 17 U.S.C.
§ 801(b) (Supp. IV 2004)).
Under the Reform Act, three permanent copyright royalty judges are to be
appointed by the Librarian of Congress to encourage settlements and, when necessary,
resolve statutory license disputes. “The expectation is that the copyright royalty judges,
appointed to staggered, six-year terms, will provide greater decisional stability, yielding
the advantages of the former Copyright Royalty Tribunal, but with greater efficiency and
expertise.” Procedural Regulations for the Copyright Royalty Board, 70 Fed. Reg. 30,901,
30,901 (May 31, 2005).
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of this proposal, Congress should include a sunset provision to induce
legislative review at the end of the first decade.185
b.

Administrative Procedures

Congress should delegate to the Copyright Office authority to
establish such procedures as it sees fit, subject to relatively brief
legislative guidance. This guidance should contain three essential
requirements. First, a fair use petitioner should be required to serve
notice on the copyright owner, if the owner can be found by a goodfaith search. Second, the copyright owner should have a full
opportunity to participate and to contest the petition. Third, the
record of a proceeding before the Fair Use Board should be restricted
to a written record,186 analogous to that used by ICANN’s Uniform
Dispute Resolution Policy for trademark disputes concerning domain
names.187 Subject to these conditions, and with the benefit of notice
and comment, the Copyright Office would be tasked to balance
substantive and procedural fairness with efficiency.
I suggest the following procedural outline to give the reader a
sense for how this proposal might be implemented. A proceeding
would commence when a potential fair user files a Fair Use Petition
with the Copyright Office and certifies that such petition has been
served upon the copyright owner(s), if known.188 Close attention
should be paid to the appropriate filing fee, which would serve as a
measure of the option value of a fair use ruling.189 Ideally, this system
185. I was persuaded to add this provision to the proposal by Jessica Litman. See also
Jacob E. Gersen, Temporary Legislation, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming Winter 2007)
(arguing in favor of sunset provisions).
186. The record would be restricted to written submissions from the participants in the
proceeding. No hearings would be held nor would there be any pre-submission discovery
permitted.
187. See INTERNET CORP. FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NOS., RULES FOR UNIFORM
DOMAIN NAME DISPUTE RESOLUTION POLICY (1999), http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrprules-24oct99.htm (see in particular ¶ 13, prescribing process for creating paper record).
188. In the event that the petitioner cannot identify or locate the copyright owner(s),
the petitioner would be required to describe in detail the efforts made to find the
copyright owner(s). The current process concerning “orphan works,” see supra note 18
and accompanying text, likely will result in procedures along these lines and should be
incorporated into the proposed procedure as appropriate.
In addition, it might be wise to require the petitioner to certify that he or she has
contacted the copyright owner to seek acquiescence, permission, or a license prior to filing
with the Copyright Office. Such a requirement could help avert needless litigation but
could also open the opportunity for undesirable strategic behaviors. I propose not making
this a requirement initially, but this possibility should be the subject of study by the
Copyright Office.
189. See Michael W. Carroll, One for All: The Problem of Uniformity Cost in
Intellectual Property Law, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 845, 886 (2006) (discussing the ways in which
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would be self-funding, but it would also be critical to ensure equitable
access for poorly-resourced petitioners. Price discrimination in the
form of either a sliding scale or some form of in forma pauperis filing
would be a desirable means to achieve this end.
The copyright owner would have a choice of two procedural
responses.
Under the first, the owner could terminate the
administrative process by filing suit for declaratory judgment in the
case of a proposed use or for copyright infringement in the case of an
existing use. Certain safeguards surrounding the timing of such filing
and conditions under which such a suit should be dismissed without
prejudice would be put in place to penalize use of the option in bad
faith.
Alternatively, under the administrative process, the copyright
owner would have ten working days to give notice of intent to
participate, and another twenty days to file any such response. The
petitioner would be given the option to reply within seven days. The
fair use judge would have discretion to grant reasonable extensions.
Of course, the absence of the copyright owner would not result in a
default judgment. The fair use judge would be obliged to make an
independent fair use assessment. The fair use judge would have a
deadline, perhaps forty-five days after the petition and any response
from the copyright owner has been filed, to issue a brief, written
decision.
This decision would be nonprecedential in that a favorable fair
use ruling would insulate only the petitioner from liability for the use
described in the petition. However, the fair use judge’s decision
would be published on the Copyright Office website to assist the
public in monitoring the Fair Use Board’s performance. The
petitioner or the copyright owner would have a right to seek review
from the Register of Copyrights, who would have ten days to decide
whether to review the decision.190 If the Register declines review, the
fair use judge’s decision would become final agency action. If the

filing fees and eligibility requirements serve as real options that filter the allocation of
intellectual property rights); see also WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 235 (2003) (discussing
filtering effects of copyright registration fees, which climbed from $10 to $20 in 1991, and
to $30 in 2000); U.S. Copyright Office, Current Fees, http://www.copyright.gov/docs/
fees.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2007) (noting that copyright registration fees are now $45).
190. Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 802(f)(1)(D) (Supp. IV 2004) (providing that the Register “may
review for legal error the resolution by the copyright royalty judges of a material question
of substantive law under this title that underlies or is contained in a final determination of
the Copyright Royalty Judges”).
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Register grants review, she would have thirty days in which to issue a
decision.
In my view, the goal should be a procedure that would not
require a petitioner or a copyright owner to be represented by
counsel to achieve substantively just outcomes. Because both
petitioners and copyright owners may have an interest in being
represented, however, I would propose that in addition to counsel the
Copyright Office permit registered “copyright agents,” analogous to
patent agents, to represent parties before the agency. I envision that
these agents would be paraprofessionals who are or have become
familiar with fair use analysis. Such agents could be required to pass
a competence examination or they could self-certify under oath that
they possess minimum competence and character qualifications.
c.

Administrative Record

The petition would consist of a copy of the copyright owner’s
work and either a copy of the petitioner’s work, if already created, or
a detailed description of the petitioner’s proposed fair use. Any
testimony would be in affidavit form, including any expert testimony
on the effect on the copyright owner’s market under the fourth fair
use factor.191 Although one can imagine a number of reasons why a
live evidentiary hearing with cross-examination would be desirable,
the stakes are limited enough that the benefits of a streamlined
procedure outweigh the costs of any erroneous determinations that
the streamlined procedures cause.192
2. Judicial Review
Judicial review of the Copyright Office’s fair use determinations
would serve as an important check on legal errors. Under this
proposal, a fair use ruling would be subject to review in any federal
circuit court of appeals. The court’s standard of review should be de
novo for three reasons. First, the record before the court would be
identical to that before the Board. Under such circumstances, the
court would be the more appropriate body to determine which
inferences may be drawn from the record and to resolve any
credibility issues raised by the parties.193 Second, deference to the
191. See supra notes 92–99 and accompanying text (discussing factor four).
192. See infra note 223 and accompanying text (discussing why the Due Process Clause
would not require an evidentiary hearing).
193. Cf. Wall Data Inc. v. L.A. County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 447 F.3d 769, 777 (9th Cir. 2006)
(providing that the standard of review is de novo when reviewing a summary judgment
ruling on fair use).
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agency’s expertise would be inappropriate in these circumstances.
The proposal would be a limited delegation from Congress to the
Copyright Office to make individual fair use determinations, but the
power to make generally binding interpretations of the law would
remain with the federal courts.194 Indeed, the Fair Use Board would
be obliged to apply judicial fair use precedent to the extent that it can
be applied.195 It would therefore be inappropriate for an appellate
court to defer to the agency’s interpretation of judicial precedent.
Finally, as has been observed, fair use now serves as one of copyright
law’s “built-in free speech safeguards.”196 The Supreme Court has
noted in analogous circumstances that de novo appellate review is
appropriate when constitutional interests are at stake.197
B.

Benefits of the Proposal

This proposal would fix fair use in three ways. First, fair use
would become available to users for whom it is currently not an
option. This group includes poorly financed potential fair users who
currently must sacrifice their expressive freedom in the face of
increasingly aggressive and unreasonable demands from powerful
copyright owners.198 This group also includes creators such as literary
authors, illustrators, and filmmakers whose opportunities to exercise
their fair use rights are overly circumscribed by the clearance culture
that predominates among risk-averse intermediaries.
For example, under this proposal, documentary filmmakers
would be able to rely upon fair use so long as their production
schedule permits the time necessary for the process envisioned herein
to run. The reason that the proposal would come to these creators’
aid is that intermediaries should accord a favorable fair use ruling the
194. Cf. Bonneville Int’l Corp. v. Peters, 347 F.3d 485, 490 n.9 (3d Cir. 2003) (two
judges on panel would have ruled that Copyright Office interpretation of a sound
recording statutory license was not entitled to substantial deference because Congress had
not shifted interpretive authority from the courts to the agency).
195. See supra Part I (describing the difficulty of acquiring guidance from fair use
precedent).
196. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003).
197. Cf. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 514 (1984)
(holding that independent appellate review is necessary when the issue is a mixed question
of fact and law regarding the availability of a First Amendment privilege); Brett
McDonnell & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Independent Judgment Review in
Copyright Cases, 107 YALE L.J. 2431, 2439–41 (1998) (arguing that Bose requires
independent appellate review in copyright cases that turn on substantial similarity
between the plaintiff’s and defendant’s works).
198. See supra notes 170–74 and accompanying text (describing the increase in
copyright owner aggression).
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same weight as a license from the copyright owner.199 Even if they do
not—because there may be a legally significant gap between the
proposed and actual use—the added certainty of a fair use ruling
ought to be sufficient to make reliance upon it an insurable risk. The
benefits of enabling fair use flow not only to the creators but also to
their audiences.
Moreover, as the body of nonprecedential, but educational, fair
use rulings grows, relying on fair use may become an insurable risk in
related circumstances. A strong impetus toward a permission culture
is the absence of insurance for commercial distributors who may
otherwise be inclined to rely on a creator’s fair use judgment or to
make their own.200 In many, but not all, cases, that position is a
reasonable response to the legal uncertainty that fair use poses in its
currently enfeebled state. To the extent that fair use rulings, and
judicial review thereof, would improve legal certainty, as has
happened with reverse engineering of software for purposes of
interoperability, it would be reasonable to expect to see insurance
companies offer fair use riders to standard errors and omissions
policies.201 The availability of such insurance should lead the legal
departments of large commercial distributors to take a more
pragmatic approach to whether reliance on fair use would be
acceptable.
Finally, it is important to anticipate likely dynamic consequences
that would follow from creation of a Fair Use Board. Two
consequences are likely to be particularly beneficial. First, licensing
discussions should become more productive.
The threat of
administrative fair use adjudication would redistribute the balance of
bargaining power in some measure, and this should increase the range
of an aggressive copyright owner’s zone of possible agreement.
Relatedly, when a potential fair user evaluates whether to seek a
license or to pursue a fair use ruling, the user would still face some
uncertainty about whether his or her desired use would be judged a
fair use. This would lead the user to be interested in a license to

199. See supra Part I.C.1 (describing the copyright clearance culture in film and music
industries).
200. See supra Part I.C (explaining reasons for the rise of a clearance culture); see also
AOKI ET AL., supra note 166, at 52–55 (observing that insurance companies “may require
clearances well beyond those required by law”).
201. See HEINS & BECKLES, supra note 38, at 5 (describing one insurance broker’s
view of conditions for a fair use rider).
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resolve that uncertainty and, possibly, to acquire a degree of freedom
in altering the scope of a proposed use.202
If implemented, the proposal also would provide a focal point for
public discussion of the critical role that fair use plays in the creative
spheres. Through such discussion, certain members of the public
would be surprised to learn about the limits of their fair use rights and
the reasons therefore. To the extent that there are infringing uses
thought to be fair by some user groups, educating those users about
the limited scope of fair use would force them and the public to
confront why copyright policy is what it is. If the absence of fair use is
materially deleterious, these users may be inspired to seek legislative
change.203
Fair use rulings also are likely to increase public awareness of
increasing aggression of some copyright owners. It would be
particularly beneficial for appellate courts to have access to this
information, because currently they rarely hear cases involving gross
overreaching due to the limited resources and limited political will of
the victims of such aggression.204 It is my prediction that appeals from
adverse fair use rulings would reaffirm for the appellate courts the
importance of striking the appropriate balance between copyright
owners and those who seek to express themselves with the aid of
words, images, melodies, or sounds created by others.
C.

On the Legality and Desirability of the Proposal

Implementing the proposal would benefit fair users, copyright
owners interested in legal certainty, and the general public, but some
interested parties and commentators are likely to raise legal and
policy objections. This Section anticipates and responds to the most
likely of these.
1. Constitutional Challenges to the Fair Use Board
Opponents of this proposal are likely to challenge its lawfulness,
arguing that it violates three provisions of constitutional law: (1) the

202. Recall that a favorable fair use ruling would insulate the petitioner from liability
only for the proposed use as detailed in the petition.
203. Cf. Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use: Threat or Threatened?, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
903, 904 (2005) (“In the legislative domain, conceivably fair use is a false promise that
keeps the public from demanding, or Congress from providing, limits on copyright.”).
204. Cf. Noam Scheiber, The Hustler: Meet Tommy Goldstein, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr.
10, 2006, available at http://www.tnr.com/doc_posts.mhtml?i=20060410&s=scheiber041006
(describing how Thomas Goldstein’s appellate advocacy has persuaded the Supreme
Court to hear an increasing number of cases involving less wealthy parties).
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doctrine of separation of powers; (2) the Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause;205 and (3) the Article III case or controversy
requirement.206 It is beyond the scope of this Article to fully brief
each of these issues. Instead, this subsection identifies the key points
that must be addressed, and sketches in the reasons why each of these
challenges should fail.
a.

Separation of Powers

In any other context, this proposal to extend the institutional
straddle of anticipatory adjudication already implemented in a
number of areas of federal law would raise no constitutional flags. It
would be treated as a standard matter of administrative law.
However, this proposal could well draw a constitutional challenge
because of the status of the Copyright Office.
The proposal would permit officers employed by an arm of
Congress to have the power to declare the rights of two or more
private parties under the Copyright Act, subject to review by an
Article III court. The Copyright Office is part of the Library of
Congress.207 The Register of Copyrights is appointed by the Librarian
of Congress and is under the Librarian’s supervision.208 While the
Librarian of Congress is appointed by the President with the advice
and consent of the Senate,209 the Library, as its name suggests, is
organized under title 2 of the United States Code, which governs
Congress.210
An opponent would argue that the proposal violates the doctrine
of separation of powers by granting an arm of Congress the right to
exercise executive power reserved to the President. According to this
argument, Article I of the Constitution grants Congress the power
only to legislate, with certain explicit exceptions, and legislation
requires bicameralism and presentment.211 Relatedly, the power to

205. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
206. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
207. See 17 U.S.C. § 701 (2000).
208. Id. § 701(a).
209. 2 U.S.C. § 136.
210. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 131–85 (describing the organization of the Library of Congress).
211. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 954–55 (1983) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl.
5 (House power to initiate impeachment), U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (detailing Senate
power to conduct impeachment trials), and U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (detailing Senate
power to approve presidential appointments, and to ratify treaties)).
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execute the laws cannot be exercised by either Congress or an officer
under its control.212
The short response is that this argument has force only to the
extent that a court would be attracted to deploy formalist rather than
functionalist separation of powers analysis with respect to this
proposal.213 One cannot completely discount this risk because some
jurists are ideologically disposed toward formalist constitutional
interpretation as a general principle. But in the main this proposal
differs materially from the kinds of legislation that have attracted a
formalist response from the Court.214 Unlike cases that prompt such a
response, this proposal does not have any feature that could be
characterized as a legislative usurpation of executive or judicial
power.
No executive agency is charged with the duty of
implementing the Copyright Act, and Congress has not sought to
insulate Copyright Office decisions from judicial review.
Moreover, in recent years, Congress has delegated increasing
authority to the Copyright Office. Most notably, the Librarian of
Congress has power to declare certain provisions of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act inapplicable to classes of work so
designated by the Librarian after notice and comment rulemaking.215
Although commentators have flagged the risk, the constitutionality of
the provision has not been challenged.216 Indeed, when courts have
reviewed Copyright Office interpretations of the Copyright Act, they
have applied standard administrative law principles as if the Office
were an executive agency.217 Consequently, there is little judicial

212. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 736 (1986) (invalidating the portion of the
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act which delegated supervisory duties to the Comptroller
General, a congressional officer).
213. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, The Sentencing Commission and Constitutional Theory:
Bowls and Plateaus in Separation of Powers Theory, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 581, 582–85 (1992)
(describing and analyzing the standard account of formalist and functionalist approaches
to separation of powers disputes).
214. See, e.g., Chadha, 462 U.S. at 944–59 (using formalist analysis to strike down a
provision that allowed members of Congress to veto executive decisions made by an
executive officer).
215. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(D) (2000).
216. See Julie E. Cohen, WIPO Copyright Treaty Implementation in the United States:
Will Fair Use Survive?, 21 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 236, 238 (1999).
217. See, e.g., Universal City Studios LLLP v. Peters, 402 F.3d 1238, 1242 (D.C. Cir.
2005) (applying the rule that “an agency’s interpretation of its own rules is entitled to
‘substantial deference’ ”); Bonneville Int’l Corp. v. Peters, 347 F.3d 485, 490 (3d Cir. 2003)
(choosing not to decide what level of deference is appropriate under standard
administrative law principles concerning the scope of legislative delegation); Satellite
Broad. & Commc’ns Ass’n of Am. v. Oman, 17 F.3d 344, 347 (11th Cir. 1994) (“The
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precedent to support the separation of powers challenge to this
proposal, and no feature of it is likely to cause a moderate jurist
concern for the integrity of the constitutional scheme.
b.

Due Process

Some critics might argue that the proposal would deny the
copyright owner due process in violation of the Fifth Amendment.
These critics would have to concede that the proposal provides the
standard due process components: notice, an opportunity to be
heard, an unbiased decisionmaker,218 and a written decision on the
record. Their argument would be limited to whether the opportunity
to be heard is adequate because the question of fair use would be
determined in the absence of a full evidentiary hearing.
A court would assess whether due process requires an
evidentiary hearing for nonprecedential, anticipatory adjudication of
fair use by applying the balancing framework established by Mathews
v. Eldridge:219
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if
any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and
finally, the Government’s interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.220
Under each factor, the balance favors the proposal. First, the
private interest at stake is narrow because the scope of a fair use
ruling is limited to whether a particular user’s use of the work is fair.
The copyright owner retains the right to relitigate the issue against
any other user.

Copyright Office is a federal agency with authority to promulgate rules concerning the
meaning and application of § 111.”).
218. Although there are structural reasons to believe that members of the Fair Use
Board would be predisposed against broad interpretations of fair use, see supra Part
II.A.1.a, this form of predisposition does not amount to bias under the Due Process
Clause.
219. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332–35 (1976) (discussing the various
factors and considerations relevant to ascertaining the minimum process due before
government implements a decision burdening a liberty or property interest); see also
Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1279–95 (1975)
(cataloguing and discussing various procedural requirements that a reviewing court might
deem procedural due process to require, and engaging in a cost/benefit analysis of each
procedure).
220. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335.
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Second, the risk of an erroneous fair use judgment is minimal. A
cynic might quip that the fair use standard is so indeterminate that
one cannot identify a determination that is legally erroneous, but that
argument reaches too far. Instead, while close cases will generate
significant differences of opinion, there are a range of decision points
that most would recognize as being within the zones of correctness
and error. However, the risk of error caused by reliance on a written
record is low because the most important evidence to the legal
determination is the comparison of the owner’s and the user’s works.
For that reason, fair use is frequently determined as a matter of law.221
A critic might argue that witness credibility is material to
determinations of the user’s intent or the copyright owner’s assertions
regarding harm to actual or potential markets and that this credibility
requires a live evidentiary hearing. However, by conditioning the
Fair Use Board’s decision upon the facts asserted in the written
record, either the user or the copyright owner could argue that the
Board decision does not apply to an actual use if the facts can be
proven to be significantly different than were asserted in the
administrative record. As important, the copyright owner would have
the opportunity to opt out of the administrative proceeding by filing
suit in federal district court, where a full evidentiary hearing would be
available.222 For this reason, little value should be assigned to a
requirement of an evidentiary hearing in all cases when such a
hearing is available as an option.
Finally, requiring a full evidentiary hearing would be nearly fatal
to the proposal. The government’s interest in giving access to fair use
to those who cannot otherwise afford it for reasons of time or
financial resources while preserving the copyright owner’s ability to

221. See, e.g., Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 608 (2d
Cir. 2006) (“Although the issue of fair use is a mixed question of law and fact, the court
may resolve issues of fair use at the summary judgment stage where there are no genuine
issues of material fact as to such issues.”); Beebe, supra note 36, at 1–5 (noting that fair use
was decided on summary judgment in a substantial minority of cases).
222. In theory, a fair use petitioner might also be able to terminate the administrative
proceeding and sue for declaratory judgment if the copyright owner files a notice of intent
to participate in the administrative proceeding. The petitioner would argue that the notice
of intent to participate generates a concrete case or controversy under Article III and the
Declaratory Judgment Act. See supra text accompanying notes 178–79 (discussing the
case or controversy requirement). If the courts did accept this argument, it would further
bolster the case against mandating a full evidentiary hearing in the administrative process,
but this is a speculative enough issue that it is not necessary to the argument.
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manage her own assets depends upon a streamlined procedure.223 In
other procedural due process cases, the government’s interest in
expediency is, and should be, outweighed by the substantiality of the
private interest and the risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest.
Here, however, where the issue to be decided by the Fair Use Board
is quite narrow, and the value of requiring an evidentiary hearing
would do little to minimize the risk of erroneous deprivation while
significantly undermining the government’s interest in creating and
administering the Fair Use Board’s procedures, the balance favors the
procedures as outlined in this proposal.
c.

Article III

Finally, an opponent of the proposal might argue that even if the
administrative process is constitutional, judicial review of a fair use
ruling would not be. The strongest version of this attack would be
that a federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction in a case in which
the copyright owner has chosen not to participate and in which the
Fair Use Board has ruled against the petitioner because there is no
cognizable case or controversy. The impulse behind this argument is
understandable. Under the proposal, petitioners such as those in the
declaratory judgment case described above224 who were dismissed
from federal district court for lack of jurisdiction would now have
direct access to a federal appellate court on exactly the same facts.
How can that be?
The answer is that the constitutional posture of the case would
be materially different because the proposal has inserted the Fair Use
Board into the process and has granted the Board the power to
determine conclusively that an individual does not commit copyright
infringement under particular circumstances. The constitutional (and
statutory) question in the declaratory judgment setting is whether
there is a live dispute between the user and the copyright owner, and
silence on the part of the owner is sufficient to render the answer
negative. In contrast, under the proposal, the case would now assume
a familiar posture in which the question is whether an agency
exercised its power according to law, and there would be a live
controversy between the Copyright Office and the user on this
question.

223. Cf. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 680–82 (1977) (holding that requiring a full
hearing before a student was subjected to corporal punishment as allowed under Florida
law would be unworkable).
224. See supra notes 180–83 and accompanying text.
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Although this should be a complete answer for Article III
purposes, a critic may still regard this as bootstrapping or sleight of
hand. But it is not. It is true that through de novo review, the court
would determine the legal question as it might have in a declaratory
judgment proceeding, but the concerns about advisory opinions that
animate the case or controversy requirement should be assuaged in
this posture. The question presented would be concrete because of
the specificity of the proposed use required in the administrative
proceeding, and the legal issues would be fully briefed because the
Office, by having ruled against the petitioner, would present the case
against fair use, and the petitioner would present the case in favor.
One other jurisdictional argument might be made that
jurisdiction should be declined because the dispute should not be
considered ripe. Ripeness issues arise when the agency’s advisory
opinion is one of many means by which an agency interprets and
applies its implementing statute. Those decisions holding that an
advisory opinion is not final agency action hold, by implication, that
when such an opinion is final action, it is subject to review.225 Under
this proposal a fair use ruling would be the Copyright Office’s only
means of interpreting § 107, and therefore by necessity they would be
final agency action.
2. On the Merits of a Fair Use Board
Skeptics are likely to oppose this proposal with three arguments:
(1) it would be unfair; (2) it would be inefficient; or (3) it would
distort judicial development of the fair use doctrine. Interestingly,
the proposal is likely to draw offsetting complaints on each of these
grounds from some institutional copyright owners and from
proponents of more vigorous user’s rights. I consider these in turn.
a.

Fairness

Some copyright owners are likely to complain that instituting
such a procedure would unfairly diminish the value of copyright
ownership. On this view, copyright owners would have to expend
precious resources monitoring and litigating fair use petitions. In
particular, they would be burdened to supply evidence concerning the
fourth fair use factor concerning harm to the copyright owner’s
market because the Fair Use Board would otherwise lack sufficient
information to make reasonable judgments on this score. Finally they
225. See, e.g., U.S. Def. Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 861 F.2d 765, 771–72 (2d Cir.
1988).
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would argue that the anticipatory nature of the adjudication would
make application of the fourth factor particularly difficult to assess
and would lead to a high error rate.
Undoubtedly, large copyright owners would want to devote some
resources to monitoring and participating in fair use adjudication.
Bearing this burden, however, would hardly be unfair. This proposal
merely creates a new procedure by which the scope of copyright
owners’ legal entitlements can be ascertained, but it does nothing to
the entitlements themselves. The volume of fair use petitions would
increase or decrease in proportion to copyright owners’ willingness to
acknowledge users’ fair use rights. If copyright owners were willing
to alter their bargaining stance in the shadow of the Fair Use Board,
they could exercise considerable control over the flow of petitions.
Furthermore, in the main, copyright owners would not be
penalized if they chose not to participate and relied on the
independent judgments of the Fair Use Board instead. As has been
noted, these judgments are likely to be skewed in favor of the
copyright owners. The only petitions likely to be materially affected
by the copyright owner’s participation are those involving uses for
which the copyright owner contends there is a potential market that
would be harmed under the fourth fair use factor. But, even if the
copyright owner chooses to forgo submitting evidence of an emerging
market, a favorable fair use ruling would be nonbinding as to any
other parties and would not prejudice the copyright owner’s ability to
prove the emerging market in litigation or with respect to a
subsequent petition.
Finally, the costs of monitoring fair use petitions would be offset
in some measure by the useful data the petitions would yield
concerning how a work of authorship is being used and valued. Say,
for example, that the owner of a copyright in a narrative work is
served with a number of petitions concerning derivative works
involving a minor, quirky character in the narrative. Such petitions
would send a signal about demand for further development of that
character, which the copyright owner could undertake or license to
others to undertake.
Users’ rights advocates would likely raise a separate fairness
concern. Some may argue that the availability of such a procedure
would serve to prejudice users’ rights because the availability of an
administrative procedure could create an expectation that it be used
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in all cases.226 Courts may be led to disfavor defendants who choose
to rely on their own fair use judgments, and a potential fair user may,
at a minimum, feel obliged to explain why he or she made a
purported fair use without having first sought an advisory opinion.
This concern is meritorious. However, even if the proposal were to
have this prejudicial effect, the net effect of this proposal should be a
greater exercise of fair use rights given the dismal state of fair use
reliance in the current environment.
b.

Efficiency—The Value of Fair Use

The fairness arguments may also be packaged in efficiency terms.
On this view, skeptics on both sides are likely to complain that the
benefits of private fair use adjudication would not be worth the price.
Opponents of the proposal are likely to minimize the benefits of fair
use clarification and to focus on, and perhaps exaggerate, private and
public administrative costs. These opponents would then declare the
proposal wasteful.
To evaluate this argument, one must make a normative judgment
about the value of fair use and about the value of fair use
clarification. I have argued that providing greater clarity about users’
fair use rights would be extremely valuable because it broadens access
to fair use and should produce positive dynamic effects. The value of
fair use clarification increases to the extent one embraces fair use as a
free speech safeguard. Uncertainty about the scope of speech rights
leads to chilling effects. In the First Amendment context, the law has
taken special measures to mitigate these effects, in particular through
the doctrines of overbreadth and vagueness.227
226. Cf. Justin Hughes, Introduction to David Nimmer’s Modest Proposal, 24
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 5 (2006) (posing questions about potential adverse
inferences in relation to David Nimmer’s fair use proposal, discussed infra at notes 244–49
and accompanying text).
227. Professor Richard Fallon summarizes the overbreadth doctrine as follows:
Against the background of the ordinary rule that no one can challenge a statute on
the ground that it would be unconstitutional as applied to someone else, a First
Amendment exception has emerged. When speech or expressive activity forms a
significant part of a law’s target, the law is subject to facial challenge and
invalidation if: (i) it is “substantially overbroad”—that is, if its illegitimate
applications are too numerous “judged in relation to the statute’s plainly
legitimate sweep,” and (ii) no constitutionally adequate narrowing construction
suggests itself.
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853, 863 (1991)
(footnotes omitted).
The First Amendment vagueness doctrine also is animated by concerns about
chilling protected speech. Rather than an exception, however, this doctrine is a more
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These doctrines do not import neatly into copyright law because
in the traditional First Amendment setting, the court must balance
the government’s interest in regulating speech against the speaker’s
and audience’s interest in communicating. In a copyright case, courts
view the government’s interest in suppressing second-generation
authors’ speech as a means to encourage first-generation authors’
speech.228 Vagueness and uncertainty in this context might then be
defended as having speech-protective features.229 However, it is not
vagueness and uncertainty themselves that are speech-protective, but
the context-sensitive definitions of the legal entitlements that protect
speech. Vagueness and uncertainty merely are byproducts of that
design. This Article’s proposal enables the law to maintain its
context-sensitive entitlements while creating a procedure to dispel the
fog of fear, uncertainty, and doubt that shrouds them, thereby
achieving the ends of the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines by
different means.
Users’ rights advocates would not deny the importance of
protecting users’ freedom of expression, but some would argue that
this proposal would not be effective at achieving that goal because the
procedure would be too lengthy and cumbersome for most potential
fair users, particularly creators seeking to make a derivative use of a
copyrighted work. It is true that this proposal would not immediately
solve the problems of creators who need very rapid fair use
determinations. However, over time, a range of patient creators
would find the process worth the wait. These could be documentary
filmmakers working independently, scholarly authors, web site
owners who wish to add a feature that includes a copyrighted work, et
cetera. As these creators use the proposed process, an administrative
and, perhaps, judicial fair use jurisprudence would emerge from the
process. As has been argued above, these developments would have
positive spillovers for others seeking fair use clarification. In the long
run, then, the arguments concerning efficiency favor this proposal.
demanding version of its due process relation. See, e.g., Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566,
572–73 (1974) (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972)) (“Where a
statute’s literal scope, unaided by a narrowing state court interpretation, is capable of
reaching expression sheltered by the First Amendment, the [vagueness] doctrine demands
a greater degree of specificity than in other contexts.”).
228. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985)
(labeling copyright the “engine of free expression” because it makes an author’s speech
marketable).
229. See Tushnet, supra note 38, at 70 (arguing that the case-specific nature of the fair
use doctrine and the idea/expression dichotomy is more speech-protective than would be a
copyright regime with rule-like definitions of users’ rights).
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Fair Use Jurisprudence

Not all observers would agree that the spillover effects of this
proposal would be positive. Indeed, the dynamic effects of the
proposal may be of greatest concern to critics on both sides. The
proposal would increase access to fair use. Undoubtedly, if adopted,
the proposal would lead to the creation of a body of fair use rulings
analogous to the body of private letter rulings by the Internal
Revenue Service and no-action letters by the Enforcement Bureau of
the Securities and Exchange Commission.230 As has been the case in
those areas of law,231 this body of nonbinding fair use rulings would be
likely to influence the development of binding fair use decisions by
the federal courts.
Some critics would argue that this influence would be corrosive.
In their view, the Copyright Office has become a captured agency.
They would argue that the Fair Use Board would also be captured
and would give fair use a very cramped reading. This Article’s
proposal acknowledges this risk.
On balance, however, the
professionalism of the administrative decisionmakers should reduce
the scope of this risk, and the availability of de novo judicial review
should serve as an important corrective tool in the event that this risk
is realized. For example, any self-respecting copyright lawyer would
advise that an author’s quotation of two lines from the lyrics of a
popular song is a fair use, notwithstanding the routine practice of
music publishers to quote a license fee for such a use.232
The argument may shift to a concern about distortions in fair use
jurisprudence because fair use petitioners may not be able to
adequately represent their interests before the Board or a court. This
view suggests a principle by which access to adjudication should be
increased only if there is a concomitant increase in access to legal
representation. To my mind, this argument is too idealistic, and it
should not be surprising that a pragmatic proposal such as this might
230. See supra notes 16–17.
231. See generally Nagy, supra note 17 (describing influence of SEC no-action letters
on judicial interpretation).
232. See, e.g., Postings of David Sanjek to Shall IASPM Take Action?, http://
www.iaspm.net/rpm/CopyRi_1.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2007) (“[If two lines of a song
were quoted, a] music publisher could go after them, or the authors of the material which
contains the quotes. I don’t state that to make people antsy and paranoid, but that is the
reality.”); CSI-Forensics, Quoting of Copyrighted Works, http://www.csi-forensics.com/
index.php?action=newsstory&nid=18 (last visited Mar. 26, 2007) (operator of fan fiction
web site analogizing quoting of song lyrics in fiction to the fan fiction equivalent of red hot
chili powder because of the likelihood that such quotation will attract a copyright owner’s
cease and desist letter).

CARROLL.BKI3

2007]

4/17/2007 3:01:43 PM

FIXING FAIR USE

1141

be unpalatable on that view. But even for the idealist, there is some
hope because pro bono assistance to some fair users might be
available through committees of lawyers for the arts found in many
cities.233 In addition, a number of law schools now offer intellectual
property clinics that might be available to represent fair users.234
If the real jurisprudential argument centers on the likely
outcomes of appellate litigation regardless of how well represented a
petitioner may be, I am unpersuaded. In my view, the appellate
courts are the best situated governmental decisionmakers to properly
understand and apply the fair use doctrine’s allocation of expressive
freedoms.235 A more subtle critique would be that, even if appellate
courts are the best situated adjudicators of fair use, they may be led
astray if they receive a case in the posture of an appeal from an
adverse fair use ruling. In such a case, the courts may be more likely
to defer to the views of the allegedly captured Fair Use Board than
the views of a district court. In this way, the mutually mediating
relationship between the courts and the Board would lead to the
ratification of a circumscribed view of fair use.
This critique has force. But baselines matter. Starting from the
current situation, in which fair use is greatly underutilized, we already
have a situation in which fair use has been greatly circumscribed de
facto. Even if this proposal were to lead to a subtly more
circumscribed fair use jurisprudence, the de facto scope of fair use
would still have increased because of the greater security the proposal
offers to fair users. Moreover, I have greater confidence in the
independence of the judiciary than do these critics. Some courts
certainly would be tempted to defer to rulings of the Fair Use Board,
but over time stronger jurists on the appellate bench would be likely
to independently evaluate the proper scope of the doctrine.
D. Good Policy, Bad Politics?
Readers who are at this point persuaded that the proposal would
improve copyright law may nonetheless harbor skepticism about its

233. See, e.g., Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts, http://www.starvingartistslaw.com/help/
volunteer%20lawyers.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2007) (listing groups offering pro bono
legal assistance to artists by state).
234. See, e.g., Glushko-Samuelson Intellectual Property Law Clinic, http://www.wcl.
american.edu/clincal/ipclinic.cfm (last visited Feb. 25, 2007); Samuelson Law, Technology,
& Public Policy Clinic, http://www.law.berkeley.edu/clinics/samuelson/about.html (last
visited Feb. 25, 2007); The Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard Law
School, http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/home/mission (last visited Feb. 25, 2007).
235. See McDonnell & Volokh, supra note 197, at 2468–69.
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political prospects. As a practical matter, for this proposal to become
law, it would have to garner the support of the Copyright Office and
at least avoid resistance from any of the larger organizations that
represent copyright owners.236 The discussion above explains why the
principal proposal is not a threat to the interests of copyright
owners.237 Indeed this proposal should be even more welcome than
the orphan works legislation promoted by the Copyright Office.238
The orphan works bill is analogous to this Article’s principal proposal
insofar as the bill is designed to promote ex ante certainty with
respect to uses of expressive works whose copyright owner cannot be
identified through a reasonably diligent search.
However, as of August 2006, the bill was opposed by certain
copyright owner representatives, primarily photographers, who argue
that the remedial relief offered by the bill merely shifts uncertainty
from users to copyright owners, who would have to worry that their
works might erroneously be deemed orphaned.239 In contrast, this
Article’s principal proposal would provide certainty on both sides
because the copyright owner would receive notice and an opportunity
to participate with respect to a concrete proposed or actual use. Even
for copyright owners, such as photographers, who admit that they
may be difficult for users to find, the Fair Use Board would still
protect their interests by independently evaluating whether a
proposed use was fair.
Even if the proposal gains some support from some copyright
owners and avoids resistance from others, there are reasons to believe
that the Copyright Office and the Librarian of Congress may not be
enthusiastic supporters in the near term. Although some of the
administrative law literature indicates that agencies reflexively seek
self-aggrandizement, the Copyright Office generally has been cool

236. See Thomas P. Olson, The Iron Law of Consensus: Congressional Responses to
Proposed Copyright Reforms Since the 1909 Act, 36 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 109, 116–
17 (1989) (arguing that Congress is reluctant to reform copyright law if it will exact
significant losses on certain interest groups and identifying the many veto points in the
legislative process).
237. See supra Part II.C.2.
238. The Orphan Works Act of 2006, H.R. 5439, 109th Cong. (2006), available at
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c109:H.R.5439.
239. See, e.g., Daryl Lang, Congress To Consider Softer Version of Orphan Works Bill,
PHOTO DISTRICT NEWS, May 23, 2006, http://www.pdnonline.com/pdn/search/Article_
display.jsp?vnu_content_id=1002540997; Advertising Photographers of America, Urgent
Message Regarding Orphan Works Bill, http://www.apanational.com/i4a/pages/Index.cfm
?pageID=3607 (last visited Mar. 3, 2007) (urging members to lobby against bill’s passage).
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toward expansion of its regulatory and adjudicative functions.240
Creation of a Fair Use Board would place the Office in unfamiliar
territory and would likely present some management, budgetary, and
public relations challenges that Office personnel might just as well
avoid. In my view, these concerns can be addressed and overcome in
the course of deliberations over this proposal.
The prospects for this proposal, then, turn on the intensity of
demand for clarification of fair use, and the Copyright Office’s
comfort level with the increasingly administrative character of
copyright law.241 I believe conditions are ripe for this proposal to be
enacted, but inertia and intransigence in some quarters may make this
idea a little ahead of its time. In the event that this is the case, I offer
two less effective, but potentially more palatable, clarification
proposals in Part III.
E.

Summary

Creating a Fair Use Board would materially improve copyright
law’s ability to balance the expressive freedoms of authors,
distributors, and users of copyrighted works without requiring
Congress to reopen the terms of the underlying legislative
entitlements. The proposal simply would extend to copyright law the
benefits of anticipatory adjudication that already are enjoyed by
those who must interpret and apply similarly complex statutory
schemes in areas such as income taxation, securities regulation,
election law, health law, and highway safety. The beneficiaries of the
proposal include more than the copyright owners and petitioners who
would appear before the Fair Use Board, because the Board’s
decisions and judicial review thereof would improve the clarity of this
area of law, as has been the case in other areas of the law that employ
advisory opinion procedures.
Finally, the proposal is fiscally
responsible and would require only a modest appropriation that could
be offset through revenues generated by filing fees.
III. FIXING FAIR USE: ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS
Part II argues that the best way to solve the problem of ex ante
uncertainty in copyright law is to provide ex ante clarity through

240. See, e.g., Remedies for Small Copyright Claims: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th
Cong. 47–48 (2006) (statement of Marybeth Peters, U.S. Copyright Office) (cautiously
offering to study issues related to establishing a small claims tribunal for copyright cases).
241. See Joseph P. Liu, Regulatory Copyright, 83 N.C. L. REV. 87, 104 (2004).
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anticipatory adjudication. In the event that the political tide has not
risen sufficiently to make safe passage for this approach to fair use
clarification, I sketch in this Part two less effective proposals to fix fair
use that could be more readily steered through the legislative shoals
and briefly address why proposals to fix fair use by rendering it more
rule-like through legislation should be resisted.
A. Reallocating Risks of an Erroneous Fair Use Judgment
If users of copyrighted works whose proposed use is a fair use
cannot be offered the prospect of ex ante immunity, they should at
least be granted some relief by reducing the outsize threat that the
remedial provisions of the Copyright Act currently impose in many
cases. This is essentially the same approach as is taken in the orphan
works bill.242 Limits on ex post relief are less satisfactory than the
anticipatory adjudication proposed in Part II because these limits
would apply when a user has erred in her fair use judgment and has
infringed a copyright owner’s rights. Thus, the ex post approach
imposes rough justice by potentially undercompensating some
copyright owners in order to induce more users to exercise their
rights of fair use. While not ideal, this rough justice would still
improve the current situation in which uncertainty about fair use has
chilled far too many users and has rendered fair use an uninsurable
risk in important settings.
1. Fair Use Rulings as Limit on Liability
If Congress were unwilling to grant the Fair Use Board the
power to immunize a petitioner from all liability, Congress should still
create a Fair Use Board and alter the legal effect of a fair use ruling
to be a limitation on liability. Under this version of the proposal, all
of the procedures outlined above would stay the same. In the event
that a fair use judge declared a proposed use to be fair, and the
copyright owner subsequently sued for infringement, the petitioner
could be held liable only for actual damages and would not be liable
for the copyright owner’s attorney’s fees. Injunctive relief would
remain available to the copyright owner.
This version of the proposal resonates with other provisions or
proposals to use nonbinding adjudication as a means of clarifying the
scope of intellectual property rights. For example, the United
Kingdom recently amended its patent law to give the U.K. Patent
Office authority to provide a nonbinding opinion concerning patent
242. See supra notes 18, 238–39.
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validity or infringement for £200 to assist parties with licensing and
litigation decisions.243
In addition, treatise author David Nimmer has advanced a
proposal analogous to this alternative.244
Under the Nimmer
proposal, Congress would provide for nonbinding fair use arbitration
to be funded entirely by the parties.245 Although nonbinding, the
arbitration decision could be used by either party to influence the
remedy for infringement.246 An unfavorable decision would be
admissible as evidence of willfulness.247 A favorable decision would
limit the copyright owner’s remedy to that proposed by the Copyright
Office for infringement of an orphan work.248 A favorable decision
also would be admissible as relevant to the question of attorney’s
fees.249
2. Broaden Relief for Good Faith
In the alternative, if Congress does not see fit to create a Fair
Use Board, it should fix fair use by reducing the scope of liability for
those who infringe with an erroneous but good faith belief that the
infringing use was a fair use. One reason that potential fair users are
unwilling to challenge overreaching by aggressive copyright owners is
that the penalties for doing so can be quite severe.250
Under this alternative proposal, the availability of injunctive
relief should be curtailed and statutory damages should be
unavailable against those who use a copyrighted work in good faith
243. U.K. Patent Office, Opinions, http://www.patent.gov.uk/patent/p-other/p-object/pobject-opinion.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2007) (describing the procedure for requesting an
opinion); see Patents Act, 2004, c. 16, § 13, available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/ACTS/
acts2004/40016--a.htm#13; see also U.K. Patent Office, Request for Opinions, http://www.
patent.gov.uk/p-object-opinion-advert (last visited Mar. 26, 2007) (describing procedures
for requesting opinions).
244. See David Nimmer, A Modest Proposal To Streamline Fair Use Determinations, 24
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 11, 11 (2006) (proposing The Fair Use Determination Given
Expeditiously Under the Statutory Indicia for Calibrating Liability and Enforcement Act
(“The FUDGESICLE Act”)).
245. See id. at 13–14. A petitioner would pay $1,000 and the copyright owner would
also have to pay $1,000 if he, she, or it wished to participate and submit the matter to a
single arbitrator. If either party preferred a panel of three arbitrators, such party could
designate the matter as complex and be required to pay an additional $9,000. Id.
246. See id. at 14–15.
247. Id. at 14.
248. See id. at 15, 21 (incorporating by reference U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT
ON ORPHAN WORKS 127 (2006), which proposes adding a new remedial section to the
Copyright Act).
249. See id. at 15.
250. See supra notes 51–56 and accompanying text (describing remedial provisions of
the Copyright Act).
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but with a mistaken belief that such a use was a fair use. If the
copyright owner were limited to proving actual damages flowing from
a colorable fair use, the damages would be less attractive, reducing
the threat of litigation and potentially increasing the owner’s
willingness to offer reasonable terms to license colorable fair uses.
Section 504(c)(2) of the Copyright Act already makes some
allowance for innocent infringers, by lowering the floor for statutory
damages to $200 where an “infringer was not aware and had no
reason to believe that his or her acts constituted an infringement of
copyright.”251 However, courts do not accept this defense readily.252
In addition, for members of certain privileged classes of users who
prove that they made an unauthorized reproduction of a copyrighted
work with a good faith belief that making such a copy or copies was a
fair use, statutory damages are to be remitted.253
Under this alternative, Congress would make the defense of
innocent infringement more robust and would extend the benefits
currently granted to special classes of users to all users who exercise
any of the copyright owner’s exclusive rights with an objective and
subjective good faith belief that such use was a fair use. Other
commentators have proposed limited expansions of the remittance
privilege under § 504(c)(2) in the field of education.254 For the
reasons stated above, however, fixing fair use is necessary for all
users.
Section 504(c)(2) should be amended to limit monetary liability,
including attorneys’ fees, and to limit the availability of injunctive
relief to cases in which a colorable fair use would have a deleterious
effect on the copyright owner’s actual market from an ex post
perspective, such as a use that would displace actual licensing
opportunities unless enjoined. In most cases of mistaken but good
faith judgments of fair use, the defendant would be liable for a
reasonable royalty as actual damages for colorable fair uses that do
not harm the copyright owner’s existing markets.

251. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2000).
252. See, e.g., L.A. News Serv. v. Reuters Television Int’l, Ltd., 149 F.3d 987, 992–97
(9th Cir. 1998) (upholding denial of fair use defense, denial of innocent infringement
defense, and $60,000 statutory damage award for unauthorized distribution of work
containing news footage of 1992 riots in Los Angeles); Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s
Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1544–45 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
253. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2).
254. See, e.g., Robert Kasunic, Fair Use and the Educator’s Right To Photocopy
Copyrighted Material for Classroom Use, 19 J.C. & U.L. 271, 291–92 (1993).
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Fair Use Rules

A different approach to improving ex ante certainty would be to
amend the Copyright Act to create a list of privileged uses or, less
forcefully, to create a list of presumptively fair uses or safe harbors.
Versions of this approach have been taken through the narrow
privilege of “fair dealing” recognized in commonwealth countries
such as the United Kingdom,255 Canada,256 and Australia.257
Indeed, in the United States our experience with fair use rules
has been primarily in relation to the educational guidelines.258 These
guidelines serve a useful purpose because they identify safe harbors—
that is, certain uses that copyright owner representatives have
indicated will not likely draw an infringement suit. As Professor
Kenneth Crews correctly notes, these safe harbors reflect
enforcement policies of certain groups of copyright owners rather
than interpretations of the Copyright Act, and these guidelines should
not be interpreted as substitutes for fair use.259
However, it certainly would be possible to promulgate fair use
rules either directly by legislation or through rulemaking under the
auspices of the Copyright Office.260 The principal objection to fair use
rules is the general objection to rules: the costs of over- and underinclusivity outweigh the benefits of ex ante certainty and cheaper
administrability. As Congress recognized when codifying fair use,
rulemakers will be unable to predict the range of uses for copyrighted
works, particularly as technological evolution enables new uses and
new markets for such uses.261 Consequently, my views align with

255. Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, §§ 28–76, available at http://
www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts1988/Ukpga_19880048_en_4.htm#mdiv28.
256. Copyright Act, R.S.C., ch. C-42, §§ 29–29.2 (1985) (Can.), available at http://laws.
justice.gc.ca/en/showdoc/cs/C-42/bo-ga:1_III-gb:s_29//en#anchorbo-ga:1_III-gb:s_29.
257. Copyright Act, 1968, c. 63, §§ 47-47J (Austl.), available at http://www.comlaw.
gov.au/ComLaw/Legislation/ActCompilation1.nsf/framelodgmentattachments/8D4A910D
452D40D4CA25725C007C61EC.
258. See supra notes 146–53 and accompanying text.
259. See generally Crews, supra note 146 (discussing negotiations over guidelines,
including those for copying for classroom use and use of broadcast media in the classroom,
and identifying circumstances in which guidelines have been misunderstood or misused).
260. This is assuming that such rulemaking would be constitutional. See supra Part
II.C.1 (discussing potential constitutional objections to rulemaking by Copyright Office).
Alternatively, an executive agency such as the U.S. Department of Commerce, which
houses the Patent and Trademark Office, might be granted such regulatory authority.
261. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 66 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5680
(“[T]he endless variety of situations and combinations of circumstances that can rise in
particular cases precludes formulation of exact rules in the statute.”).
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Judge Leval’s262 on this subject because ex ante rulemaking lacks the
important context sensitivity that the proposals submitted above
would preserve.
To be clear, the proposals above imagine the possible emergence
of soft rules through repeated adjudication, and these would further
improve ex ante certainty about fair use. The primary proposal
would fix fair use for many users even if the doctrine were entirely ad
hoc because certainty could be had for a particular use. In fact,
however, uses fall into patterns, and over time, the process of
adjudication can yield some certainty concerning select uses.
The principal proposal would seed the process for improved
development of similar soft rules for other uses by providing a record
of adjudication of a range of uses. While these adjudications would
be nonprecedential, over time, if a particular use were to be the
subject of numerous petitions and the outcomes were predominantly
in one direction or the other, users would gain a degree of improved
certainty about the legality of potential uses.263 This process would be
far more flexible and fine-grained than any legislative or regulatory
approaches to fair use rules would likely be and it is therefore
preferable.
CONCLUSION
Copyright law must respond to the rise of copyright owner
aggression and its chilling effects and respond to increasing
uncertainty surrounding uses of new technologies by providing
greater ex ante certainty about the scope of fair use or by reducing
the risks of relying on fair use through ex post relief.
The best way to improve certainty concerning fair use would be
to institute an administrative procedure to provide anticipatory,

262. See Leval, supra note 33, at 1135 (“A definite [fair use] standard would champion
predictability at the expense of justification and would stifle intellectual activity to the
detriment of the copyright objectives. We should not adopt a bright-line standard unless it
were a good one—and we do not have a good one.”).
263. Arguably this is what has happened with respect to use of domain names under
the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (“ICANN”) Uniform
Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (“UDNDRP”). See ICANN, Uniform Domain
Name Dispute Resolution Policy, http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-policy-24oct99.htm (last
visited Feb. 25, 2007). An oft-litigated issue has been the use of a trademark in a domain
name of the form www.[trademark]sucks.com. Courts routinely have held such uses to be
noninfringing. Arbitrators issuing nonprecedential decisions under the UDNDRP have
been less uniform. However, the pattern is now consistent enough that it is clear enough
that a “[trademark]sucks” second-level domain will be noninfringing, at least if the
content of the site reflects some speech critical of the trademark owner.
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nonprecedential adjudications that would offer immunity from suit.
Such a procedure would maximize ex ante certainty for fair users and
copyright owners in individual cases, would lead to a more robust
body of fair use interpretations that others could refer to for
guidance, and would reduce the frequency of the unreasonable
bargaining impasse in the shadow of such a procedure.
In the alternative, Congress should fix fair use by providing ex
post relief for users who erroneously rely on fair use in good faith.
This can be done either through the anticipatory adjudication
procedure contemplated in the primary proposal or by reducing the
range of remedies in the copyright owner’s arsenal that can be
deployed against such users. An alternative solution, the creation of
legislative or regulatory fair use rules, would improve ex ante
uncertainty at the expense of the flexibility that lies at the heart of the
fair use doctrine. The social costs of the under- and over-inclusivity
that such rules would impose in the face of technological and
expressive evolution outweigh the benefits of this approach to
improved certainty in fair use law.
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APPENDIX: PROPOSED FAIR USE BOARD AMENDMENT
110TH CONGRESS

H. R. _______

1ST SESSION

To amend title 17, United States Code, to create a Fair Use Board
with authority to declare individual uses of copyrighted works to be
fair uses.
________________________________

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
[Date]
[Sponsors]
________________________________

A BILL
To amend title 17, United States Code, to create a Fair Use Board
with authority to declare individual uses of copyrighted works to be
fair uses.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the “Fixing Fair Use Act of 2007.”
SEC. 2. REFERENCE.
Except as otherwise expressly provided, whenever in this Act an
amendment or repeal is expressed in terms of an amendment to, or
repeal of, a section or other provision, the reference shall be
considered to be made to a section or other provision of title 17,
United States Code.
SEC. 3. FAIR USE JUDGE AND STAFF.
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(a) The title of Chapter 8 is amended to read as follows:
“CHAPTER 8—PROCEEDINGS BY SPECIAL PURPOSE
JUDGES”
(b) In general—Chapter 8 is amended by inserting the following:
“Sec. 806. Fair Use Judges; appointment and functions.
“(a) Appointment.—The Librarian of Congress shall appoint 3 fulltime Fair Use Judges, and shall appoint 1 of the 3 as the Chief Fair
Use Judge. The Librarian shall make appointments to such positions
after consultation with the Register of Copyrights.
“(b) Function.—Subject to the provisions of this chapter, the
function of the Fair Use Judges shall be to issue written
determinations of whether an actual or proposed use of an original
work of authorship protected under this title is or would be a fair use
under section 107. Such determinations are limited to the actual or
proposed use set forth in the Fair Use Petition in section 808(b)(5)
and are binding only on the petitioner, her heirs, assignees, licensees
or any other successors in interest and the copyright owner and her
heirs, assignees, licensees or any other successors in interest.
Determinations by Fair Use Judges shall have no preclusive effect
with respect to any other parties or any other uses of the work other
than the use that is the subject of a determination by a Fair Use
Judge.
“(c) Rulings.—The Fair Use Judges may make any necessary
procedural or evidentiary rulings in any proceeding under this
chapter and may, before commencing a proceeding under this
chapter, make any such rulings that would apply to the proceedings
conducted by the Fair Use Judges.
“(d) Administrative Support.—The Librarian of Congress shall
provide the Fair Use Judges with the necessary administrative
services related to proceedings under this chapter.
“(e) Location in Library of Congress.—The offices of the Fair Use
Judges and staff shall be in the Library of Congress.
“Sec. 807. Fair Use Judgeships; staff.

CARROLL.BKI3

1152

4/17/2007 3:01:43 PM

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85

“(a) Subsections (a)–(e) and (g)–(i) of section 802 of this chapter
shall apply mutatis mutandis to the Fair Use Judges and their staff.
“(b) Independence of Fair Use Judge.—Fair Use Judges shall
have full independence in making determinations concerning
application of section 107 to a proposed or actual use of an original
work of authorship protected under this title.
“(c) Review of legal conclusions by the register of copyrights.—
The Register of Copyrights may review for legal error the resolution
by the Fair Use Judges of a material question of substantive law
under this title that underlies or is contained in a final determination
of the Fair Use Judges. The Register shall give notice of intent to
review not later than 10 business days after a Fair Use Judge has
issued a determination. If the Register gives such notice, the Register
shall issue a written decision correcting such legal error, which shall
be made part of the record of the proceeding. The Register of
Copyrights shall issue such written decision not later than 40 days
after the date on which the final determination by the Fair Use Judge
was issued. Additionally, the Register of Copyrights shall cause to be
published in the Federal Register and on the Copyright Office web
site such written decision, together with a specific identification of the
legal conclusion of the Fair Use Judge that is determined to be
erroneous. As to conclusions of substantive law involving an
interpretation of the statutory provisions of this title, the decision of
the Register of Copyrights shall not be binding as precedent upon the
Fair Use Judges in subsequent proceedings under this chapter. When
a decision has been rendered pursuant to this subparagraph, the
Register of Copyrights may, on the basis of and in accordance with
such decision, intervene as of right in any appeal of a final
determination of the Fair Use Judge pursuant to section 808(b)(5).
If, prior to intervening in such an appeal, the Register of Copyrights
gives notification to, and undertakes to consult with the Attorney
General with respect to such intervention, and the Attorney General
fails, within a reasonable period after receiving such notification, to
intervene in such appeal, the Register of Copyrights may intervene in
such appeal in his or her own name by any attorney designated by the
Register of Copyrights for such purpose. Intervention by the
Register of Copyrights in his or her own name shall not preclude the
Attorney General from intervening on behalf of the United States in
such an appeal as may be otherwise provided or required by law.
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“(d) Effect on judicial review.—Determinations by the Fair Use
Judges or by the Register of Copyrights under this section shall be
reviewed de novo by the United States courts of appeals.
“Section 808. Proceedings of Fair Use Judges.
“(a) Proceedings.—
“(1) In general.—The Fair Use Judges shall act in accordance
with regulations issued by the Fair Use Judges and the
Librarian of Congress, and on the basis of a written record.
“(2) The Fair Use Judges shall rule on Fair Use Petitions
individually.
“(b) Procedures.—
“(1) Fair Use Petition.—A proceeding under this chapter shall
commence with the filing of a Fair Use Petition. The Register
of Copyrights shall have authority to make such regulations as
are necessary to specify the form and manner of submission of
a Fair Use Petition, except that Fair Use Petitions must clearly
identify:
“(A) the original work(s) of authorship that are used or
are proposed to be used;
“(B) the actual or proposed use of such original work(s) of
authorship;
“(C) the owner of the exclusive right(s) granted by section
106 of this title that will be exercised by the actual or
proposed use of the original work(s) of authorship; and
“(D) the reasons why the actual or proposed use of the
original work of authorship is or would be a fair use under
section 107 of this title.
“(2) Service on Copyright Owner.—A complete copy of the
Fair Use Petition must be served on the owner(s) of the
exclusive right(s) granted by section 106 of this title that are or
will be exercised by the actual or proposed use identified in
the Fair Use Petition not later than the time the Fair Use
Petition is filed with the Register of Copyrights. The Fair Use
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Petition must be accompanied by a statement certifying the
time and manner of such service.
“(3) Copyright Owner’s Participation.—The owner(s) of the
exclusive right(s) granted by section 106 of this title that are or
will be exercised by the actual or proposed use identified in
the Fair Use Petition shall have not more than 10 days after
the Fair Use Petition has been filed to file a notice of intent to
oppose the Fair Use Petition. The statement opposing the
Fair Use Petition must be filed with the Register of
Copyrights not later than 20 days after the filing of the notice
of intent to oppose. The statement of intent to oppose and
the statement opposing the Fair Use Petition must be served
upon the proponent of the Fair Use Petition accompanied by
a statement certifying the time and manner of such service.
“(4) Fair Use Petitioner’s Reply.—The proponent of the Fair
Use Petition may file a statement in reply to the statement
opposing the Fair Use Petition described in paragraph (3) of
this subsection not later than 7 days after the date such
opposing statement was filed. Such reply statement must be
served upon the owner(s) of the exclusive right(s) granted by
section 106 of this title that are or will be exercised by the
actual or proposed use identified in the Fair Use Petition
accompanied by a statement certifying the time and manner of
such service.
“(5) Fair Use Judge’s Determination.—The Fair Use Judge
shall issue a written determination not later than 45 days after
the date for filing the reply statement described in paragraph
(4). The Fair Use Judge’s determination shall be made
publicly available on the Internet without charge within a
reasonable time after the determination has been issued.
“(c) Termination of Proceedings.—Any owner of one or more of
the exclusive rights granted by section 106 of this title that are or will
be exercised by the actual or proposed use identified in the Fair Use
Petition may terminate the proceedings under this section by filing
suit for copyright infringement or for a declaratory judgment of
infringement against the proponent of the Fair Use Petition in a
district court of the United States.

